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It finally happened. On Tuesday, December 3, 1996, a Honolulu judge
struck down a Hawaiian law permitting only opposite-sex couples to marry,
and Hawaii became the first state to recognize same-sex marriages.1 Of
course, the ruling hardly came as a surprise. The surprise had come three years
earlier, when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in Baehr v. Lewin' that a
restriction on same-sex marriage constituted sex discrimination under the state
constitution and remanded to give the state an opportunity to show that its law
served a compelling interest. Still, the trial court's finding that it did not brings
a further degree of closure to one chapter in the same-sex marriage
controversy: We can confidently predict that Hawaii will recognize same-sex
marriages, for while the trial court stayed its mandate pending appeal, it is very
unlikely that the decision will be overturned.
Now that a state has made same-sex marriages legal, the battleground for
gay and lesbian couples shifts to other states-eventually, perhaps, to persuade
these states to follow Hawaii's lead; in the meantime, to get them to recognize
the validity of same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii. But opponents of
legally recognized marriages between same-sex partners have not been
quiescent. On the contrary, horrified by the prospect that gay and lesbian
couples might be able to marry in Hawaii and force other states to recognize
their union fully and for all purposes, adversaries of same-sex marriage began
a campaign to limit the effect of Hawaiian law almost as soon as Baehr was
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decided. Efforts were made to persuade state legislatures to adopt statutes
explicitly declaring that same-sex marriages violate public policy and are void.
These efforts succeeded in a number of states.
The popular media raised questions about whether such laws were
permissible or whether states would be required as a matter of full faith and
credit to recognize marriages celebrated lawfully in Hawaii.4 So opponents of
gay and lesbian marriage went to Congress. They found a receptive audience,
and Congress soon enacted the ironically named "Defense of Marriage Act"
(DOMA), which permits states to refuse recognition to "any public act, record,
or judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State."
5
As same-sex couples begin making plans to get married in Hawaii, and as
other states begin gearing up to deny their marriages any effect, some
important questions arise. First, assuming that states are not required to permit
same-sex marriage under their own laws, to what extent does the federal
Constitution obligate them nevertheless to recognize such marriages if validly
performed in Hawaii? Second, assuming that states sometimes are obligated to
recognize Hawaiian marriages, can Congress relieve them of the obligation?
As we will see, both questions are more complicated than partisans on either
side of the issue seem to have realized.
Part I of this Article describes existing law. The traditional, and still usual,
rule for interstate marriages is to uphold the validity of a marriage valid where
it was celebrated. This "place of celebration" rule is then subject to a number
of exceptions, most of which are narrowly construed. The vast majority of
cases in which an exception is made are based on "public policy," among the
hoariest of hoary conflicts doctrines. The availability of this exception appears
to make DOMA unnecessary by making potential same-sex marriage problems
easy from a conflict-of-laws perspective.
That is true, however, only if one accepts the law that allows states to
make this exception. Part II, the heart of the Article, argues that the public
policy doctrine ought to be deemed unconstitutional-not just in same-sex
marriage cases, mind you, but across the board.6 The argument, in a nutshell,
3. See, e.g., ARaZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C) (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-
81r (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(a) (Supp. 1996); 750 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1
(West, Westlaw through 1996 Act 89-679); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96 (West 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-1-15 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michte
1995).
4. See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Couple Who Stirred Issue of Same-Sex Marriage Still Hopefid, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1996, at A12; Melissa Healy, Senate OKs Bill Against Same-Sex Marriages, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1996, at Al; John E. Yang, Senate Passes Bill Against Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, Sept.
11, 1996, at Al.
5. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2419, 2419
(to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7).
6. There may be other potential sources of constitutional protection for gay and lesbian couples who
1966 [Vol. 106: 1965
Same-Sex Marriage
is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits states from selectively
discriminating in choice of law based on judgments about the desirability or
obnoxiousness of other states' policies. However much sense this exception
makes in international law, where a case for it can still be made, it has no
place in the American federal system.
Part II goes on to examine the implications of this understanding of full
faith and credit for choice of law generally and for marriage in particular.
These are significant, but hardly calamitous. For apart from "better law"
analysis-which permits courts to choose among conflicting laws by picking
the one deemed to reflect more enlightened policy, and which, I conclude,
should also be found unconstitutional-modern approaches to choice of law
are all carefully structured to avoid inquiries about whose law is preferable or
superior as a substantive matter. Most choice-of-law doctrine would thus
remain unaffected.
What my argument means for marriage law in particular depends on how
states respond to this new constitutional regime. If the argument in Part I1 is
right, states will find it difficult to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages
celebrated lawfully in Hawaii without altering their existing choice-of-law rules
for marriage generally. They will not lose the ability to adopt and enforce rules
respecting which marriages are valid and which are not; Hawaii cannot, after
all, dictate marriage law to the rest of the nation. They will, however, lose
their ability to single out Hawaii law for nonrecognition through use of the
public policy exception. Some states may respond by extending the place of
celebration rule even to same-sex marriages celebrated in Hawaii. Others,
however, may choose to adopt an alternative approach to choice of law:
perhaps one of the modern approaches, like interest analysis, the Second
Restatement, or comparative impairment. This is perfectly acceptable even
though it may result in denying recognition to some same-sex marriages
celebrated in Hawaii. The only limitation proposed here is that, whatever
choice-of-law rule or approach a state adopts, it cannot alter its willingness to
apply foreign law based solely on the substantive policy of the other state.
want to marry, but they probably do not offer much hope of success at the present time The Court's recent
decision in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). stnking down on equal protection grounds a provision
of the Colorado constitution that prohibited state and local legislatures from offenng "special' protection
to gays and lesbians, came as something of a surprise. I suspect that Justice Kennedy followed his unusual
line of reasoning in the case precisely because the Court is not yet prepared generally to raise the level of
scrutiny given to laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual onentauon In the meantime. Bossers v
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), stands as implacably as ever in the way of direct substantive protection
And neither the Privileges and Immunities Clause nor the right to travel offer much upon % hich to build
an argument. A Note in the Stanford Law Review tries hard to construct a plausible argument based on
these rights but still concludes that it is unlikely to succeed. See Thomas M. Keane. Note. Aloha.
Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recogniton of Same.Sex Marriage3, 47 STAN"
L. REv. 499, 508-10 (1995). Indeed, the author must stretch even to make the case look plausible, at least
in situations where a nonresident couple travels to Hawaii solely to evade the marnage restrictions of their
home state.
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A state cannot do this, that is, unless Congress has the power to make an
exception to full faith and credit and to authorize states to refuse recognition
to same-sex marriages. Hence, DOMA may not be supererogatory after all.
Part III therefore examines Congress's power to prescribe choice-of-law rules
for states. Under the Effects Clause of Article IV, Congress is entitled to
define how each state's law shall be treated by other states. It might follow
that Congress can permit states to deny recognition to same-sex marriages on
public policy grounds, in which case DOMA ends any remaining legal
controversy (politics is another matter). But the limits of congressional power
under the Effects Clause have never been examined, in part because Congress
has never tested them. And the better interpretation is that Congress's power
to create choice-of-law rules is not unlimited-federal authorities have no more
business authorizing a public policy exception than do states. DOMA is
unconstitutional.
I. EXISTING DOCTRINE
A. Choice of Law
Before proceeding further, we need to understand the basic rules governing
choice of law in marriage cases. To recapitulate the law in this area fully
would take some time; no surprise really, since nothing in conflicts law is ever
neat or tidy.7 There are just too many states making independent decisions and
too many different variations of each problem to consider. For present
purposes, we can work with the following paradigmatic situation: A and B live
in state X, which does not recognize their right to marry; they travel to Hawaii
to get married, and immediately after the ceremony return home to resume
their lives together. How would state X view their marriage?
7. For more detailed summaries than mine, see ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAW ch. 23 (4th ed. Michie Co. 1986) (1959); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS ch.
13 (2d ed. 1992); Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents
of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 560-76
(1993-94); Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of
Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REv. 450,454-66 (1994); Candice L. Sage, Note,
Sister-State Recognition of Valid Same-Sex Marriages; Baehr v. Lewin-How Will It Play in Peoria?, 28
IND. L. REv. 115 (1994).
8. This sort of "weekend marriage" presents the weakest case for applying Hawaii law to determine
the validity of a marriage. Other cases can easily be imagined in which Hawaii's claim to have its law
govem would be stronger: longtime Hawaii residents may move to state X; one of the spouses may die,
leaving property in X; or one of the spouses could move to X without getting a divorce, leaving doubts as
to marital status. In each of these cases, Hawaii's interest in having its law determine marital status is
stronger than in the case where Hawaii's only contact is that X's residents were married in Hawaii. I want
to work with this case, however, both because it is the hardest one and because it will be by far the most
common.
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As a general matter, every state recognizes the validity of a marriage valid
where it was celebrated (i.e., where the marriage contract was made).9 The
place of celebration rule is not, of course, carved in stone or revealed from
heaven. States do not have to follow it, and nothing in the Constitution
precludes them from adopting a different rule (say, for example, applying the
law where either or both of the parties are domiciled when they get married).
A variety of considerations-in particular, widely shared policies that favor
validating marriages consummated in good faith and enabling partners to know
with certainty whether their marriage is valid-have led states to conclude that
the best rule is one recognizing marriages legal where they were celebrated.
This has long been the rule in every state of the United States,'" and it
continues to govern pretty much without regard for whether a state adheres to
the traditional jurisdiction-selecting rules or opts for one of the fancier modem
approaches."
Its general convenience notwithstanding, every state recognizes situations
in which it abandons the place of celebration rule. Many states, for example,
will recognize a marriage that is invalid in the state where it was celebrated
if it is valid where the parties are domiciled. 2 Conversely, some states will
refuse to recognize a marriage that is valid where it was celebrated if the
partners went there solely to evade restrictions imposed in their domicile.
13
Surprisingly, this entirely reasonable exception is rarely used," and its
9. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 283 (1971); SCOLES & HAY. supra note
7, § 13.5.
10. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 121 (1934). JOSEPH STORY.
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 113 (8th ed. Boston. Littlc. Brown & Co 1883).
I1. See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If Me Marry in Hawiau. Are We Still
Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033. 1097-98; cf SCOLES & HAY, supra note 7.
§ 13.2, at 433 (stating that law of state where marriage was celebrated will govern where such law conflicts
with law of state of domicile if expectations of parties to marriage would be thwarted under law of
domiciliary state). Traditional and modem approaches to choice of law are detailed infra notes 105-12 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 7, § 13.5, at 437. More than 20 states have adopted this rule
by legislation. Seven have done so by enacting the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. which provides that
marriages are valid if "valid at the time of the contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place
in which they were contracted or by the domicil of the parties." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE ACT §
210, 9A U.L.A. 176 (1987). Fourteen other states have drafted their own validating legislation. See Cox.
supra note 11, at 1066-68 nn.185-208 (citing statutes); Keane. supra note 6. at 515 n.103 (same).
13. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 7, § 13.2, at 432; id. § 13.14. at 453-54; RussEu. J WE NrRAtuB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 5.1C, at 234 (3d ed. 1986). The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform Laws adopted a proposal to this effect in 1912 but withdrew It in 1943 The
Uniform Marriage Evasion Act is still on the books in four states that adopted it. however. See Cox. supra
note 11, at 1074. Illinois is in the unique position of having adopted both marriage evasion and marrage
validation legislation. See id. at 1073.
14. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 7, § 13.2, at 432; id. § 13 14, at 454; WErRAuB. supra note 13,
§ 5.1C, at 234. Compare, e.g., Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1958) (applying domictliary law
to annul marriage on ground that bride was underage in action brought by her soon after marage). wath
State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957) (refusing to apply domiciliary law to charges of contibuting
to delinquency of minor brought against parents by state soon after marnage), and In re May's Estate. 114
N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953) (refusing to allow child to preclude father from appointment as executor of mother's
estate by showing that marriage of 32 years was invalid in domiciliary state).
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appearance often depends on how quickly a marriage is challenged and
whether the challenger is one of the partners or some other interested party.
Even where the rule against deliberate evasion is codified, courts have
construed it narrowly and found ways to uphold most marriages. 5
By far the most common exception to the place of celebration rule is for
marriages deemed contrary to the forum's strong public policy, and this again
seems to be true regardless of how a state generally handles its choice-of-law
problems. 6 Of course, public policy is not violated every time the forum's
law differs from that of the place of celebration; otherwise, the exception
would swallow the rule. Rather, as in other contexts where "public policy" is
used to avoid a conflicts rule, the exception applies (in Judge Cardozo's well-
known formulation) only where another state's law violates "some fundamental
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal."' 7 Although invocation of the public
policy exception varies somewhat from state to state, a number of common
situations are found in marriage law. Typically, states turn to public policy in
connection with issues like incest, polygamy, marriage by minors, and the
length of any waiting period required before remarrying after a divorce."
Two refinements should be noted in how the public policy doctrine is used
in marriage cases. First, the exception is not employed as an overly blunt tool,
but is selectively refined in application. Rather than repudiate the place of
celebration rule in every case that would be incest under forum law, courts in
many states recognize that some differences are more matters of degree than
of fundamental policy.'9 A state that permits second cousins to marry may be
more willing to recognize a law extending the privilege to first cousins than
one extending it to siblings; a state that permits sixteen-year-olds to marry may
apply another state's law permitting fifteen-year-olds to do so, but not one
extending the right to nine-year-olds. States may also be more likely to ignore
public policy considerations for couples with legitimate expectation interests:
There is an obvious difference between a couple that recently married outside
a state to evade that state's marriage restrictions and a couple that moved into
the state after living together for twenty years in a place that recognized their
union.20
15. See Cox, supra note 11, at 1074-82.
16. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. k (1971); WEINTRAUB, supra
note 13, § 5.1A, at 230-31; Cox, supra note 11, at 1098; Henson, supra note 7, at 562-76; Hovermlll,
supra note 7, at 455-66; Sage, supra note 7, at 118-20.
17. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918). Weintraub calls Cardozo's
formulation in Loucks "[t]he classic definition of public policy as a valid reason for closing the forum to
suit." WENrRAUB, supra note 13, § 3.6, at 84.
18. See treatises cited supra note 7.
19. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 7, §§ 13.11-.12.
20. See In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953); Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American
Conflict of Laws, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 952, 960 (1977).
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Second, many states distinguish between the validity of a marriage and the
ability to enjoy its "incidents." There was a time when courts treated marriage
as a simple yes-or-no, up-or-down proposition: A marriage was either valid,
in which case it was valid for all purposes, or it was not, in which case it was
invalid for all purposes. Particularly in this century, however, judges have been
willing to draw finer lines, applying the place of celebration rule to the
question of validity while saving the public policy exception for particular
"incidents" of being married.21 The right to cohabit, for example, is a usual
incident of being married, but not a necessary one. A man married to two
wives in India might be able to move to Kansas without being prosecuted for
bigamy, but Kansas might forbid the three of them from living together.22 At
the same time, the surviving wives might both be permitted to inherit as
spouses under the state's law of succession.'
Two relevant generalizations can be made about choice of law in marriage
cases. First, the place of celebration rule governs the vast majority of cases.
Exceptions exist, but these are used with considerable reluctance, even when
embodied in statutes. Second, of the small subset of cases in which the place
of celebration rule is not applied, the vast majority are decided on public
policy grounds. Other exceptions exist, but these are seldom invoked and
typically appear in conjunction with a public policy objection. A state may, for
example, allow parties to marry elsewhere solely to evade its restrictive law
unless they do so to get the benefit of a law deemed contrary to the forum's
strong public policy. As same-sex marriages become an issue, then, we can
expect reluctant states to turn to the public policy doctrine to protect their
interests.
B. The Public Policy Doctrine
Given its likely role at the heart of any future controversy over same-sex
marriages, I want to examine the public policy doctrine a bit more closely. A
public policy exception in some form is recognized in every state of the United
States and has always been part of conflict-of-laws analysis in this country."'
21. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 284 cmt. c (1971); Hovermll. supra note
7, at 465-66.
22. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 7, § 219, at 604 & n.5 (citing cases)
23. See In re Dalip Singh Bit's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 501 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Miller v. Lucks,
36 So. 2d 140, 141-42 (Miss. 1948); In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255. 259 (Pa. 1974); 2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 284 cmts. c-d (1971); WEIN RALB, supra note 13. §
5.1B.
24. Useful discussions of the public policy doctrine can be found in any conflict-of-laws treatise. A
brief analysis of its origin and history can be found in FRIEDRICH K. JUENOER. CHOICE OF LAW AND
MULTISTATE JUSTICE 79-81 (1993), or HENRI BATIFFOL & PAUL LAOARDE. I DRoIT INTER.NATIONAL
PRIVP 1 354-55 (7th ed. 1981). Classic treatments that are still valuable include Ernest G. Lorenzen.
Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws. 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Arthur Nussbaum. Public
Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws. 49 YALE LJ. 1027 (1940); and Monrad G. Paulsen
& Michael I. Sovem, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws. 56 COLtMI. L. R.Ev 969 (1956).
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It actually developed earlier, as a matter of customary international law, and
was incorporated into American practice with no particular thought given to
its appropriateness in the context of a federal system defined by a written
constitution.' "Public policy" functions as an escape from the usual conflicts
rules: Content with its choice-of-law rules in most cases, a court may on
occasion find itself asked to apply a law significantly at odds with forum
notions of justice or good policy. In such cases, the court can use the public
policy doctrine to make an exception, refusing to apply the undesirable law.
The basic idea is captured nicely in Judge Cardozo's description in Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co.,' a fragment of which was already quoted above:
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or
fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal. 27
I want to highlight four aspects of the public policy doctrine here.28 First,
in conflict of laws the phrase "public policy" normally refers to judge-made
exceptions to a state's choice-of-law rules and does not include exceptions
created by statute. But the essence of the public policy doctrine, plainly
expressed in Cardozo's language, is that the law of another state need not be
recognized if it too deeply offends forum standards. It is, in other words, a
content-based principle. That being so, I see no reason to limit the doctrine to
judicial decisions, and in this Article I will use the term "public policy" to
refer to any decision, whether by statute or common law, to make an exception
to otherwise applicable choice-of-law rules when those rules select a law
embracing disfavored policy. After all, it makes absolutely no difference from
the perspective of either the parties or other states whether the decision that
some law is too offensive to apply comes from a state's courts or from its
legislature. Statutes directing courts not to follow the place of celebration rule
if this means recognizing marriages the forum deems incestuous, polygamous,
or otherwise undesirable are, for all relevant purposes, identical to judicial
decisions reaching the same result.
Second, if courts took Judge Cardozo's language in Loucks seriously, the
public policy exception would be very narrow and relatively unimportant. At
25. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 313 (1992). For example, see STORY, supra note
10, the seminal text organizing the modem field of conflict of laws, which treats international and interstate
cases and problems interchangeably.
26. 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
27. Id. at 202.
28. The justification for this exception is examined in greater detail below. See infra notes 92-101 and
accompanying text. For the moment, I want only to describe its basic operation in practice.
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least among states of the United States, very few laws that are also
constitutional can fairly be characterized as violating "fundamental principles
of justice." Problems like segregation and abortion, and maybe even same-sex
marriage, reflect differences on this order, but little else. Yet while the public
policy exception has been relatively confined in the marriage cases, it is
invoked far more frequently in other contexts, and in much more dubious
circumstances. Is the Loucks test truly satisfied by laws setting damages
caps?29 Authorizing direct actions against insurers?"° Permitting spouses to
sue one another in tort?3 Barring guests from doing so?32 Enforcing a
noncompetition agreement?33 Permitting insurance proceeds to be set off
against tort damages?34 One could go on endlessly citing examples like these,
but the point seems clear enough: Courts have broad discretion to use the
public policy doctrine, and they have exercised it to lower the threshold of
what violates public policy to a considerable degree. It is tempting to dismiss
these (and a thousand other) decisions as abuses, but at some point an "abuse"
becomes so widespread that we must acknowledge it as the rule. So it is (and
has been for some time since Loucks was decided) with respect to both the
lowered threshold for invoking the public policy doctrine and the broad
discretion implicit in its use. Many commentators, myself included, dislike the
exception for precisely this reason. But it remains popular with judges.35
Third, in its traditional formulation, courts that used the public policy
doctrine would dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. This makes sense given the
explanation for making an exception: Forum choice-of-law rules direct the
court to apply another state's law that the court is reluctant to recognize
29. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526. 529 (N.Y. 1961) (holding that New York
public policy considerations allowed plaintiff to recover damages in excess of Massachusetts statutory
limit).
30. See Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 239 N.E.2d 799, 802-03 (ill. 1968) (holding that Illinois public
policy barred direct suits against insurers and, therefore, Illinois courts could not be forum for cases brought
under Wisconsin direct action statutes).
31. See Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597. 598-600 (N.Y. 1936) (holding that New York public policy
precluded any tort liability between spouses stemming from Connecticut law).
32. See Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710, 713 (S.D. 1989) (holding that wife could sue husband under
favorable South Dakota guest statute because foreign state's guest statute contradicted South Dakota public
policy).
33. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670. 678-79 (Tex. 1990) (holding that Texas rather
than Florida law applied to enforceability of noncompetition agreement, whose terms expressly chose
Florida law as govering agreement, because of Texas public policy concerns)
34. See Moore v. Subaru of America, 891 F.2d 1445. 1449-50 (10th Cir 1989) (holding that
Oklahoma law requiring setoffs applied despite parties' contractual choice of Indiana law) As a technical
matter, Moore and DeSantis were cases involving the scope of party autonomy in contract and rested on
the "fundamental policy" exception of I RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 87(2Xb)
(1971). But while the Restatement suggests that its test of "fundamentality' is less stnngent than the
common law public policy exception, see id. § 187(2)(b) cmt. g. in practice the two exceptions arc treated
as interchangeable.
35. The charge of arbitrariness is to some extent answered (though not entirely eliminated) if the
decision to make an exception on public policy grounds is embodied in a statute, as is true in a number
of states with respect to same-sex marriages. See supra note 3. But statutes of this son are rare in other
contexts, and most states have declined to adopt them even in connection with same-sex mamage.
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because of its content. That fact does not make forum law more applicable,
however, so the court simply declines to exercise jurisdiction-leaving the
parties free to enforce their rights in some less offended forum. This is clearly
how Judge Cardozo thought the exception worked in Loucks. Today, however,
courts that rely on public policy seldom stop at the jurisdictional threshold, but
rather make the occasion an excuse to apply forum law.36 This is invariably
true in the marriage cases; rather than merely refuse to apply the place of
celebration rule, courts routinely apply forum law and declare the suspect
marriages invalid.37
Finally, although courts do not say so, the extent and nature of the contacts
between the parties, the litigation, and the forum plainly bear on whether the
public policy exception is applied. Calling this "the 'relativity' of public
policy," Professor Arthur Nussbaum explains:
In general, however, a foreign law which in itself is repugnant to
the forum will be accorded recognition where the repercussion of that
law upon the forum is remote and unharmful. Although the forum
abhors polygamy, it will, nevertheless, recognize the legitimacy of a
child born abroad in a polygamous marriage entered into and valid
abroad. All depends on the circumstances, or, more precisely, on the
importance of the "contacts" of the case with the territory of the
forum.3"
I like to illustrate this point to students by asking them to compare two cases
decided within two years by a New York court whose membership underwent
no significant changes: Mertz v. Mertz,39 and Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-
Gesellschaft.4 In Mertz, the court found that a Connecticut law permitting
spouses to sue one another was contrary to New York public policy;4' in
Holzer, the court ruled that Hitler's Nuremberg laws were not.42 I think it
safe to say the difference is not that Connecticut's decision to lift interspousal
immunity violated "some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals," whereas Germany's decision to bar non-Aryans
from working or being paid did not. But Mertz involved a husband and wife
from New York injured while driving in Connecticut, while Holzer was
brought by a German citizen against his German employer. In neither case
does the court rely on this consideration, but it seems fair to assume that it was
nonetheless significant.43
36. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 29-34.
37. See, e.g., Owen, 444 N.W.2d at 713.
38. Nussbaum, supra note 24, at 1030-31 (footnotes omitted).
39. 3 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1936).
40. 14 N.E.2d 798 (N.Y. 1938).
41. See Mertz, 3 N.E.2d at 600.
42. See Holzer, 14 N.E.2d at 800.
43. It may still seem difficult to read about Holzer without reacting cynically to the court's failure to
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Most conflicts scholars explain this "relativity" principle as a tool judges
use to mask their preference for a policy-based approach to conflict of laws.
Faced with a case in which there are significant forum contacts, but unwilling
openly to abandon a choice-of-law rule that makes these contacts irrelevant,
the court invokes public policy to reach a more desirable outcome. In this
imagining, the public policy exception is driven less by the offensiveness of
foreign law than by the arbitrariness of traditional choice-of-law rules. Hence,
as Monrad Paulsen and Michael Sovern conclude, "[t]he common invocation
of the public policy argument to defeat a foreign claim is a denial that foreign
law should govern at all and an assertion of the forum's right to have its law
applied to the transaction because of the forum's relationship to it."''
Whether true or not as a description of underlying judicial motives, the
fact remains that the public policy doctrine operates selectively based on the
content of foreign law. The forum may choose to abandon its ordinary rule in
some cases where forum contacts are strong, but departures are limited to a
subset of such cases in which the otherwise applicable foreign law is, in
addition, deemed offensive. In the marriage context, for example, states have
not used public policy surreptitiously to replace the place of celebration rule
with a rule that turns on the couple's domicile. Rather, the forum continues to
recognize the marriages of forum residents celebrated elsewhere-except where
the marriage in question is deemed particularly objectionable. In other words,
invocation of the public policy exception may sometimes reflect increased
forum concern based on the strength of the forum's contacts, but the increased
concern remains a reaction to the content of the foreign law that would
otherwise apply.
With these premises in mind, we can predict the likely operation of the
public policy doctrine in same-sex marriage cases. With or without explicit
authorization from Congress or state legislatures, courts are relatively free to
make an exception to the place of celebration rule for same-sex marriages.
They are most likely to do so, moreover, in cases like my initial hypothetical,
in which a couple travels to Hawaii to get married with no intention of
changing domiciles. If applied, the exception almost certainly will lead to a
invoke the public policy exception: Apart from laws permitting slavery or apartheid. it is hard to think of
examples where the doctrine seems so appropriate. In fairness to the judges, there was a further
complication. Holzer was seeking damages for breach of contract as a result of being fired, and his
employer defended on the ground that German law left the employer no choice but to discharge him. To
apply the public policy doctrine thus meant permitting Holzer to bring his claim for damages while denying
the defendant its only viable defense. n Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper. 286 U S 145. 160 (1932).
the Supreme Court held that, when public policy is raised to bar a defense rather than a clain, fairness
requires the court either to deny the request or to dismiss the whole case for lack of jundiction- In Holzer.
the court chose the first alternative. It did not leave Holzer remediless. however, for it went on to hold that
language in the employment contract requiring compensation in the event Holzr became "unable to work"
could be interpreted to include causes other than physical dtsability, like being placed in detention.
Concluding that this made it inappropriate to dismiss at the pleading stage, the court remanded for further
proceedings. See Holzer, 14 N.E.2d at 800-01.
44. Paulsen & Sovem, supra note 24, at 981.
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declaration that such marriages are invalid.
It is possible that some courts could choose not to classify same-sex
marriages as contrary to their states' public policy, which may explain why
conservatives in so many states are lobbying to have the principle codified.
Advocates of gay and lesbian rights have been surprisingly successful in
blocking these efforts, though a number of states have adopted legislation
explicitly declaring same-sex marriages void or contrary to public policy.45
These victories merely leave the issue open for judicial resolution, however.
And while a number of commentators have argued that public policy does not
require a state to invalidate same-sex marriages,46 I suspect that such
marriages will continue to be disapproved in most states for at least the
foreseeable future. Given the discretion and flexibility inherent in the public
policy doctrine, arguments that it is not always applied in similar or even
"worse" situations probably will not matter much. The simple fact is that the
public policy exception is readily available for use in nullifying same-sex
marriages performed in Hawaii, and it is probably naive not to expect states
to use it.
II. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Is that all, then? Both popular and academic commentators seem to think
that the Constitution should have something to say about the matter. They
point in particular to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which looks on its face
as if it were written for precisely this sort of problem.47 As presently
interpreted, however, this Clause requires a forum to apply another state's law
only if the forum state lacks significant contacts with the parties or
litigation.48 The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not, in other words, require
a state to defer to the place of celebration if that state is (for example) the
domicile of either or both of the married parties.
A. Some Basic Doctrine
It is probably worth taking a moment to explain this interpretation, which
at a glance could be thought to contradict the plain language of the Full Faith
45. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 3.
46. See Cox, supra note 11, at 1099-117; Henson, supra note 7, at 576-81; Hovermill, supra note 7,
at 481-92; Keane, supra note 6, at 516-28; Note, In Sickness and in Health, in Hawaii and Where Else?:
Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2038, 2045-50 (1996); cf.
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriages, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745,788-93 (1995) (noting arguments for limiting public policy exception).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts... of every other State."). As noted above, supra note 6, there are other arguments that can be made
to support the unconstitutionality of restricting same-sex marriage, but these seem unlikely to succeed,
48. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19, 821-22 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
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and Credit Clause. No one paid much attention to the problem of faith and
credit to laws (as opposed to judgments) until well into the twentieth century.
Because every state followed basically the same choice-of-law rules, there was
little disagreement about whose law governed particular cases. Problems arose,
but these were handled within the rubric of established common law doctrine,
which everyone just assumed was consistent with constitutional
requirements.49
This complacent uniformity began to deteriorate in the early years of the
twentieth century under the strain of progressive and realist jurisprudence,
combined with new statutory and common law actions that did not easily fit
into traditional common law categories. For the first time, lawyers and judges
began to ask what it really means to give full faith and credit to another state's
laws. And an unexpected difficulty appeared: Taking the language of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause literally would lead to "the absurd result that,
wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the
courts of the other, but cannot be in its own."50
While this obviously was unacceptable, an appropriate alternative was not
immediately apparent. One possibility was to hold that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause demands the use of particular choice-of-law rules. But which
rules? This approach required the Supreme Court either to freeze further
development in choice of law by constitutionalizing the traditional rules, or to
invest considerable time and effort in devising new ones. And either way, for
the Court to have assumed this responsibility would have meant cutting off
experimentation just when a failing consensus in favor of the traditional rules
made it most necessary. What is more, constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules
would have deprived states of a significant measure of autonomy in an area not
previously thought to be exclusively federal.
The Court grappled with this problem for several years before finally
settling on an acceptable solution. At first, it attempted to balance competing
interests, holding that "[p]rima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its
own courts its own statutes,"51 but that the forum might have to yield if one
of the parties shows "that of the conflicting interests involved those of the
foreign state are superior to those of the forum. ' 52 This left states relatively
free to experiment with choice of law in most cases, but it proved difficult to
administer, leading the Court to retreat further to a form of minimum contacts
analysis. Under this approach, still the law today, an interested state can
49. See generally Laycock, supra note 25, at 298-301 (discussing this iniial penod) Early cases to
reach the Supreme Court thus were disposed of on the presupposition that the truditional rules applied. See.
e.g., Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615. 622-24 (1887); Bonaparte v Tax Court,
104 U.S. 592, 594-95 (1881).
50. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. 294 U.S. 532. 547 (1935).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 548.
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always apply its own law without regard for the competing interests of other
states.53 The Full Faith and Credit Clause serves only a modest screening
function: It prohibits states with no interest from applying their laws, but does
not dictate any particular choice among interested states. This leaves choice of
law almost entirely in the hands of state courts, with somewhat chaotic results.
Congress can always step in, however, exercising authority expressly conferred
upon it in the Effects Clause.54 The Court's position is thus to minimize
federal judicial interference, given the difficulty of the task involved, and to
wait for Congress to act if things in the states get too out of hand.
Not everyone agrees with this approach. A number of commentators have
urged the Supreme Court to impose uniform national choice-of-law rules. 55
Others suggest that if the Court is not inclined to change its practice across the
board, it might at least consider toughening the requirements of full faith and
credit in selected areas; same-sex marriage, these critics suggest, is a good
place to start.56
For what it is worth, I think the Court made the right decision on this
question. As anyone familiar with the continuing controversy in choice of law
can attest, there is still nothing remotely close to a consensus on how to think
about developing choice-of-law rules. Even if we could agree on a philosophy
or approach, moreover, the task of converting it into particular rules would be
fantastically time-consuming and difficult, particularly if this were to be
attempted case by case in constitutional litigation. The Supreme Court has
reduced its docket a lot in recent years, but it still is in no position to assume
this responsibility.
Nor is it feasible to think about turning the problem over to lower federal
courts by overruling Klaxon 57 (as some critics have suggested) and thereby
53. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818-19 (1985); Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13 (1981); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). My statement applies only to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. The Due Process Clause imposes an additional constraint in the form of protecting
defendants from unfair surprise, although the Court no longer distinguishes this protection from that
deriving from full faith and credit. These developments are traced, in the oblique way that casebooks do
this sort of thing, in ROGER C. CRAMTON FT AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 258-97 (5th ed. 1993).
54. This provides: "And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1. The Clause
is discussed in greater detail infra Part III.
55. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN, L. REV. 1, 32-33
(1963); Michael H. Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law: Deference to State Courts Versus Federal
Responsibility, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 419, 431-36 (1960); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLum. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1945); Laycock, supra note 25, at
332-34.
56. See Henson, supra note 7, at 589 (arguing that states have "strong interests" in having their
marriage laws respected and that, "it is in the nation's best interest to provide all American citizens with
uniformity for their expectations regarding the most basic of state-encouraged institutions"); Keane, supra
note 6, at 501-08 (arguing that Full Faith and Credit Clause calls for application of only one law
everywhere and that place of celebration is best choice for that law); cf. Habib A. Balian, Note, '71 Death
Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 403-06 (1995)
(arguing that marital decree may be converted into final judgment, giving rise to more stringent protection).
57. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that federal courts exercising
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freeing them to develop choice-of-law doctrine in diversity cases.58 Federal
trial and appellate courts have no jurisdiction to review state courts in civil
cases, and Congress is unlikely to start authorizing cross-system appeals
now.5 9 Yet without such review, it is doubtful that state courts will follow
whatever rules federal courts devise in their diversity cases; is that not, after
all, the lesson of Swift v. Tyson?' Besides, we have no reason to think that
lower federal courts will do a better job than state courts in developing good
rules or achieving uniformity." Finally, we should not underestimate the
states' legitimate interest in preserving their autonomy in this area. There was
a time when choice of law was viewed as "merely" procedural. But the
modem "revolution" in the field was prompted by recognition that selecting an
applicable law is part of the process of interpreting laws to define the elements
of a claim or defense.62 However much one likes or dislikes the alternatives
generated as a result of this insight, there is no going back, and no denying the
substantive nature of the problem.
As for selecting particular problems for enhanced constitutional regulation,
the difficulty comes in drawing lines. The same arguments used to justify
federalizing choice of law for marriage-that certain states have particularly
strong interests and that uniformity is especially important--can be made
to work for a host of other problems, making it exceedingly difficult to halt the
slide down this particular slippery slope. If there is a basis for selective
intervention, it presumably turns on the relative degree of disarray in the states,
as this provides the most persuasive justification for federal interference. On
diversity jurisdiction must apply choice-of-law rules of state in which they sit)
58. Such was the implicit suggestion of no less an authority than Hart and Wechsler See HfNRY NI
HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEI)ERAL SYmsnot 634-35 (1953) The
suggestion has not been embraced by their successors See RICHARD H. FAL.ON, JR FT AL. HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYrl.Ni 698-99 (4th ed 1996) (challenging lirst
edition's response to Klaxon).
59. Indeed, Congress recently all but eliminated the only thing even resembling loicr federal court
appellate review of state courts, viz. habeas corpus. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 102, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N (110 Stat.) 1214, 1217 (to be codified at 28 U S C
§ 2253(b)).
60. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (permitting federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction to make their
own determinations of substantive common law with respect to questions of general law) Although Sw sft
was consistent with doctrinal understandings in the mid-nineteenth century. the Court also hoped that state
courts would follow the federal lead, producing uniform national common law Instead. as the Court in Ene
noted, "the benefits expected to flow from the rule in Swiftl did not accrue." because the "Iplersistence
of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented uniformity" Erie R R v
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938). There is absolutely no reason to think that states will be more easily
led when it comes to choice of law.
61. This is especially true if, as seems likely, they follow the plurality of states by embracing the
rudderless and unhelpful "most significant relationship" test of 2 REsTATFhsE.\'T (ScOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWs § 283 (1971). See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 53, at 619
62. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFI T Oi- LAws 3-47
(1942); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT o0- LAWS 178 (1963). Larry Kramer. Choice
of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV 547. 567-79 (1996). 3re alo tifra note 105 (dt.cussmg
choice-of-law revolution).
63. See supra note 56 and accompanying text
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that score, however, marriage ranks low on the list, as choice-of-law practice
is relatively uniform and well-settled, especially in comparison to areas like
tort or contract.
B. The Equality Component of Full Faith and Credit
It does not follow that just because an interested state does not have to
apply another state's law, it may choose not to do so for whatever reasons or
in whatever manner it wants, no more than the fact that Congress does not
have to confer welfare benefits means that Congress may confer such benefits
on the basis of race or religion. A greater power does not always include the
lesser power to discriminate in its exercise on any basis whatsoever. It is one
thing to adopt a choice-of-law rule applying forum law whenever the forum
has an interest. It is quite another to adopt a rule agreeing to apply other
states' laws except when these are deemed offensive. Most commentators take
the constitutionality of the public policy doctrine on faith, but a good argument
can be made that it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause.'
Start with Hughes v. Fetter,65 a little known case that has received
modest attention from conflicts scholars but few others. Hughes was killed in
a car accident with Fetter, and the administrator of his estate (also named
Hughes) brought a wrongful death action in Wisconsin against Fetter and
Fetter's insurer. Although the accident occurred in Illinois, all four
parties-decedent, plaintiff, defendant, and defendant's insurer-were citizens
of Wisconsin. Because Wisconsin's wrongful death statute permitted recovery
only for actions "'brought for a death caused within' the state,66 the plaintiff
sought relief under the law of Illinois.
The Wisconsin court held that its statute did more than just limit recovery
to deaths in Wisconsin where it was the basis for seeking relief; it also
established "a local public policy against Wisconsin's entertaining suits brought
under the wrongful death acts of other states.' 67 The state court accordingly
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, "'dismissing the
complaint on the merits. "'68 Note that the plaintiff's claim was not dismissed
under Wisconsin's wrongful death statute. That is, the Wisconsin court did not
decide to apply Wisconsin law and then dismiss because the plaintiff failed to
64. Not one of the standard treatises on conflict of laws even asks about the constitutionality of the
public policy exception. A few commentators have raised the question and concluded that the exception
is unconstitutional, see CURRIE, supra note 62, at 288-89; Brown, supra note 46, at 791; Jackson, supra
note 55, at 26-27; Laycock, supra note 25, at 313, but none of these commentators has developed the
argument in any depth. I have long held this view, see CRAMTON Er AL., supra note 53, at 302-03,
although the same-sex marriage controversy provides the first meaningful excuse to develop it fully.
65. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
66. Id. at 610 n.2 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (1949)).
67. Id. at 610.
68. Id. (quoting Wisconsin trial court).
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allege a death occurring in Wisconsin. Rather, the court inferred that
Wisconsin's wrongful death statute established an additional policy prohibiting
Wisconsin courts from entertaining suits based on the wrongful death statutes
of other states. Dismissal was based on this implied rule.
The Supreme Court reversed in a short, impressionistic opinion. According
to Justice Black, Wisconsin could have applied its wrongful death statute to the
plaintiff's claim. This would have led to the same result of dismissal, because
Wisconsin required as an element of a claim that the death have occurred in
Wisconsin. But the parties' Wisconsin domicile gave Wisconsin a sufficient
interest to apply its law, and (as the Court had already made clear in earlier
cases)69 in a conflict "between the public policies of two or more states" with
legitimate interests, the forum need not defer to the interests of another
state.70
Yet this is not what Wisconsin had done. Instead, Wisconsin had adopted
a policy "against permitting Wisconsin courts to entertain . . . wrongful death
action[s]" based on other states' laws and dismissed on that basis. Hughes thus
involved a "more basic conflict" between this Wisconsin policy and "the strong
unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward
maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or
recognized by the statutes of sister states.' In that clash, the Court held,
"Wisconsin's policy must give way.' 72
Hughes has long puzzled the commentators, who generally describe it as
standing for some ill-defined obligation to provide a forum or explain the
decision on grounds other than those offered by the Court." In a rather
famous essay, for example, Brainerd Currie decided that the best explanation
of Hughes is that Wisconsin had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause by making the forum available to one class of its citizens
while denying the same forum to another class distinguished only by the place
of injury.74 Alternatively, a number of colleagues responded to an earlier draft
of this Article by pointing to the fact that Wisconsin had dismissed "on the
merits" and arguing that Hughes stands for the proposition that a state cannot
dismiss with prejudice without applying some state's substantive law. The
problem with both interpretations is that they have nothing to do with the
opinion Justice Black actually wrote. The Supreme Court made no reference
69. See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industnal Accident Comm'n. 306 U S 493. 502 (1939),
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S 532. 547 (1935) (cted in Hughes. 341 U S
at 611 n.7).
70. See Hughes, 341 U.S. at 611-12 & n.10.
71. Id. at 612.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 440-47 (4th cd 1995).
MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 318-21 (10th ed 1996)
74. See Brainerd Currie, The Constiturion and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv L REV
36 (1959).
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to equal protection, and while it mentioned in its description of the facts that
the state court had dismissed on the merits, the point played no role
whatsoever in the subsequent analysis. As Judge Friendly has reminded us in
another context, "[a] court's stated and, on its view, necessary basis for
deciding does not become dictum because a critic would have decided on
another basis."75 A careful reading that pays closer attention to what the
Court actually said suggests that Hughes has more interesting, and broader,
implications. 76
The Court's opinion presents the following puzzle: What is the difference
between a law that limits recovery to accidents that occur in
Wisconsin-which the Supreme Court says Wisconsin could have
applied-and a law that limits recovery to actions based on Wisconsin
law-which the Court holds is unconstitutional? Both lead to dismissal, but
only the former is allowed. Why?
One explanation might be that only the former law promotes legitimate
state interests. Wisconsin may, in fact, have a number of reasons for limiting
its wrongful death statute to deaths occurring in Wisconsin. The state may
decide that recovery should be limited to situations that serve Wisconsin's
interest in deterring negligent conduct in the state. Or Wisconsin could choose
to subordinate its interests in compensation to the deterrence interests of other
states by leaving their laws to govern liability for accidents occurring within
their territory. Or, most plausibly perhaps, Wisconsin can justify the limitation
on procedural grounds, restricting wrongful death litigation to deaths occurring
in Wisconsin because witnesses and other evidence are more likely to be
located within the state and so within reach of the court's subpoena power.
The result in Hughes would make sense if no similar justification were
available for Wisconsin's rule limiting wrongful death actions to those based
on Wisconsin law. States may not be required to defer to other states' laws if
applying forum law advances a legitimate forum interest, but the forum must
have such an interest. Otherwise, full faith and credit requires the court to
apply the law of a state that does.
The problem with this explanation, a point hammered home by Justice
Frankfurter in dissent, is that Wisconsin did have a legitimate justification for
declining to entertain claims based on the wrongful death statutes of other
states-the very same procedural policies used to rationalize limiting wrongful
death statutes to deaths within the state:
The decision of Wisconsin to open its courts to actions for wrongful
deaths within the State but close them to actions for deaths outside the
75. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
383, 385-86 (1964).
76. The interpretation offered below also makes sense of Justice Frankfurter's dissent, which, on these
alternative explanations of Hughes, is inexplicably beside the point.
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State may not satisfy everyone's notion of wise policy. See Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). But it is neither
novel nor without reason.... Wisconsin may be willing to grant a
right of action where witnesses will be available in Wisconsin and the
courts are acquainted with a detailed local statute and cases construing
it. It may not wish to subject residents to suit where out-of-state
witnesses will be difficult to bring before the court, and where the
court will be faced with the alternative of applying a complex foreign
statute-perhaps inconsistent with that of Wisconsin on important
issues-or fitting the statute to the Wisconsin pattern. The legislature
may well feel that it is better to allow the courts of the State where
the accident occurred to construe and apply its own statute, and that
the exceptional case where the defendant cannot be served in the State
where the accident occurred does not warrant a general statute
allowing suit in the Wisconsin courts."
While not exactly overwhelming, these are unquestionably legitimate concerns.
Yet if the problem in Hughes is not that Wisconsin's rule serves no
appropriate ends, then what is wrong with it?
The problem is that Wisconsin had chosen an inappropriate means with
which to pursue these ends. To understand Hughes, we should distinguish
between two kinds of laws: those that promote a state's objectives by defining
the parties' substantive rights in particular ways, and those that promote a
state's objectives by withholding from state courts the power to entertain
claims based on other states' laws. Most laws are of the former type, like
Wisconsin's wrongful death statute limiting recovery to deaths occurring in
Wisconsin. When it comes to the applicability of such laws, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause has little to say. States may define substantive rights differently,
and so long as the forum has a legitimate interest-so long, in other words, as
we are dealing with the usual "conflict between the public policies of two or
more states"T-the forum may apply its law notwithstanding any other state's
competing interest.
Laws of the second type, which can be described as discriminating against
other states' laws, are different. A state that chooses to promote even
legitimate objectives by directing its courts not to entertain claims based on
other states' laws generates "a more basic conflict"-not just between its
policy and that of another state, but between its policy and what Justice Black
says is "the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit
Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations
or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states."" And because
this means of advancing state objectives is so directly at odds with the primary
77. 341 U.S. at 618-19 (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting).
78. Id. at 611-12.
79. Id. at 612.
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objective of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state that uses it will have its
discriminatory law subjected to heightened constitutional scrutiny.
Hughes does not make clear just how strict this heightened scrutiny is
supposed to be.8" On the one hand, the scope of review is plainly more
stringent than rational basis scrutiny; otherwise, Justice Frankfurter would be
right. Indeed, the difference between the majority and the dissent is precisely
that Justice Frankfurter would uphold Wisconsin's law on the ground that it
is rationally related to a legitimate state objective, whereas the Court demands
something more. On the other hand, the test is apparently less demanding than
strict scrutiny, a conclusion suggested by Justice Black's willingness to
countenance forum non conveniens as a ground for refusing to enforce the
laws of other states.81 Although forum non conveniens is justified by the
same sort of reasons as those used by the dissent to rationalize Wisconsin's
law in Hughes, it operates in a more refined manner: taking choice-of-law
considerations into account together with a variety of other relevant factors,
and leading to dismissal only when adjudication of the particular case is truly
inconvenient. Wisconsin's rule, in contrast, irrebuttably presumed that every
case based on another state's wrongful death statute was too inconvenient to
hear in Wisconsin, and solely because it was based on non-Wisconsin law.
Such discrimination is impermissibly overbroad.
An accurate statement of the holding in Hughes would thus seem to be
that state rules that discriminate against the laws of other states are subject to
some form of intermediate constitutional scrutiny; that is, they must be
justified by substantial reasons, and the discrimination must bear a substantial
relationship to the state's objectives. Nor is Hughes limited to rules that
discriminate on their face against the laws of other states. In Broderick v.
Rosner,82 for example, a Depression-driven New York enacted legislation to
pierce the corporate veil and make bank shareholders personally liable for a
share of the bank's debts. The New York Superintendent of Banks brought an
action in New Jersey to recover unpaid assessments levied against 557 New
80. It is worth observing, for the sake of clarity, that while the structure of my argument mimics
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, I neither rely on that Clause for
authority nor wish necessarily to embrace all its nuances and particularities. The general notion of
heightened scrutiny, requiring that a law be specially justified and more closely tailored to its ends, is
associated with a number of different provisions of the Constitution, including, for example, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-35,
at 532-45 (2d ed. 1988), and the First Amendment, see id. § 12-2, at 791-93. I am simply arguing that,
like these provisions, the Full Faith and Credit Clause specifies a class of legislation subject to more careful
scrutiny: in this case, laws that close the forum to claims based on another state's law. The lines of legal
authority on which my argument rests are thus distinct from equal protection law, though the general
framework of analysis is similar.
81. See Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612-13 ("The Wisconsin policy, moreover, cannot be considered as an
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, whatever effect that doctrine might be given if its use
resulted in denying enforcement to public acts of other states."). Note that the Court appears to be saying
that it is irrelevant whether dismissal is on the merits or not.
82. 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
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Jersey shareholders of a failed New York bank. His suit was dismissed under
a New Jersey statute requiring such actions to be brought in the form of an
equitable accounting in which the corporation, its officers, stockholders,
debtors, and creditors were all necessary parties. 3 Because of limitations on
joinder and on the court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-
state parties, bringing this action was a practical and legal
impossibility-which is precisely why New Jersey required it. Justice Brandeis
held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause nevertheless compelled New Jersey
to entertain the suit:
A State may adopt such system of courts and form of remedy as it
sees fit. It may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. But it may not, under the guise of merely affecting the
remedy, deny the enforcement of claims otherwise within the
protection of the full faith and credit clause, when its courts have
general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties.'
Like Hughes, Broderick has troubled commentators. Brainerd Currie, for
example, found it difficult to explain why New Jersey's rule was
unconstitutional. New York's expressly declared policy was to protect bank
creditors by extending the liability of bank shareholders. New Jersey had
adopted the opposite policy-the more familiar one of protecting shareholders
through limited liability. According to Currie, if New Jersey's law is
unconstitutional it must be because New Jersey had not declared this policy
openly, making it, in effect, a state without an interest." But laws seldom
include explicit declarations of policy, and courts routinely articulate these in
the process of statutory interpretation. A better explanation for Broderick is
that New Jersey had tried to accomplish by subterfuge what Wisconsin had
done openly in Hughes: to advance its policy by depriving its courts of power
to entertain suits based on other states' laws. That New Jersey did this by
subterfuge was irrelevant. So long as the state intended to discriminate against
claims based on the laws of other states, the Full Faith and Credit Clause's
prohibition applies.86
This antidiscrimination principle is, in fact, how the Court explained
Hughes in its subsequent decision in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 7 which
said that the result turned on the fact that "the forum laid an uneven hand on
causes of action arising within and without the forum state. Causes of action
83. See id. at 638-39.
84. Id. at 642-43 (citations omitted).
85. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 347.
86. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) (holding that proof of discnminatory purposc
is necessary to establish violation of equal protection).
87. 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
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arising in sister states were discriminated against."88 But if that is the test, the
public policy doctrine must be unconstitutional. For surely "offensiveness"
cannot be an appropriate reason under the Full Faith and Credit Clause for
refusing to entertain a claim based on another state's law. It is difficult to think
of a justification more at odds with the principal mission of the Clause. On this
score, I agree wholeheartedly with Doug Laycock that
Texas can reject the law of Libya in this high-handed way, or even
the law of Alberta, and it may occasionally need to do so. But it
cannot so treat a sister state admitted to the Union on an equal footing
with itself. The public-policy exception is a relic carried over from
international law without reflection on the changes in interstate
relations wrought by the Constitution. 9
I do not mean to suggest that Hughes and Broderick compel us to
conclude that the Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits certain forms of
discrimination against other states' laws, including the public policy doctrine.
Standing alone at a distance of half a century or more, these cases are too
small a hook on which to hang so large an argument. 90 But in Hughes and
Broderick we see the Court clearly groping toward a principle that makes
considerable sense in its own right. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of
a bundle of provisions incorporated into the Constitution to bind states more
closely together. These include the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Extradition Clause, the Guarantee Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the now-
defunct Fugitive Slave Clause-all added precisely so that states would not
stand in relation to one another as independent nations. With respect to full
faith and credit in particular, the whole point was that states should not be free
to dismiss or ignore the laws of sister states; the states were to be a
community, with mutual obligations to respect each other's laws and
judgments. The central object of the Clause was, in fact, to eliminate a state's
prideful unwillingness to recognize other states' laws or judgments on the
ground that these are inferior or unacceptable. If anything should be off-limits
in such a system, it is the public policy doctrine.9'
88. Id. at 518-19.
89. Laycock, supra note 25, at 313.
90. Note, too, that Hughes presents a discrimination problem different from that posed by the public
policy exception. The Wisconsin rule at issue in Hughes served a legitimate purpose but was impermissibly
overbroad, whereas I am arguing that the discrimination reflected in the public policy exception does not
serve a legitimate state interest.
91. Additional support for the proposition that it is inappropriate for states to discriminate against the
laws of sister states may be found in analogous decisions prohibiting states from discriminating against
federal law. See Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). Although the federal/state problem obviously could be analyzed
differently, the Court in these cases did not say that states were obliged to open their courts to federal
claims as a matter of federal supremacy. Instead, it held that states could not decline to make a forum
available solely because the plaintiff's claim was based on federal law.
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I want to emphasize the narrowness of this argument. I am not saying that
states should lose their existing discretion to experiment with different choice-
of-law systems or to apply their own laws where they have a legitimate
interest. Nor should they be required to defer to another state simply because
the other state might prefer them to do so. What is forbidden is a state's
refusal to apply another state's law, otherwise applicable under forum choice-
of-law rules, on the ground that it promotes a policy the forum finds
repugnant. The measure of repugnance in this sense is fixed by the federal
Constitution, and states have no business selectively ignoring or refusing to
recognize the constitutional laws of sister states because they do not like them.
A case that has contacts with another state such that the forum deems it
outside the forum's sphere of interest (as defined by forum choice-of-law
rules) does not slip back into that sphere because of the content of the other
state's law.
It might be different were there a good argument for retaining a public
policy exception-were there, in other words, an argument that the public
policy doctrine serves a substantial state interest. But, as Laycock suggests,
while there may be room for this doctrine in international law, it makes no
sense in the context of a federal union like ours. 92
Conflict of laws is, in essence, a system to enable courts from different
jurisdictions to help each other enforce their respective laws.9 Imagine a
world in which courts could not apply any law but their own. Forum shopping
would be rampant, and the law would lose all chance of being uniform and
predictable. States would be unable to enforce their laws whenever parties
litigated elsewhere. They could, to be sure, enforce their laws in cases litigated
in their courts, but that is desirable only if the cases litigated in each state
happen also to be those implicating that state's policies to the greatest
extent-a coincidence unlikely to be realized in practice.9
Questions of federalism have been much in the news, and the Court. of late As has becn true
throughout American history, however, the controversy has mostly concerned questions of Congress's
power to displace state substantive regulation. Interstate relations. including the extent to which these are
regulated by the Constitution, have seldom caused similar difficulties. No one questions that provisions like
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause are designed to limit the
sovereignty of states vis-A-vis one another, and over time, the Supreme Court and Congress have steadily
extended the scope of these duties with little opposition. Since the 1960s, for example, the Court has
significantly narrowed the traditional exception to full faith and credit for judgments rendered by a court
lacking subject matter jurisdiction. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein. 116 S Ct. 873 (1996);
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). Similarly, Congress has enlarged the extent to which child custody
decrees are entitled to recognition in sister states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
92. See Laycock, supra note 25, at 259-61, 312-13; see also infra text accompanying notes 98-101
93. This paragraph and the next summarize arguments I have developed at greater length elsewhere
See Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code. 89 MICH L. RtiV 2134 (1991); Larry
Kramer, Rethinking Chwice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277. 311-44 (1990) [hereinafter Kramer.
Rethinking]; Larry Kramer, Return of rite Renvoi, 66 N YU L REV. 979. 1015-28 (1991) thereinafter
Kramer, Renvoil.
94. Here is another way to see this last point: Suppose we array the univemse of potential cases along
a continuum running from those a state deems most important to those of little or no interest to it How
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These problems can be reduced (although never entirely eliminated) by a
system that recognizes the transitory nature of legal claims and allows parties
to litigate in different jurisdictions without necessarily changing the applicable
law. Choice-of-law rules thus serve two purposes: (1) they identify the most
appropriate law to govern particular cases,95 and (2) they provide a
mechanism for cooperative decisionmaking by courts in different jurisdictions.
The success of the rules, whatever they are, depends on the willingness of
courts in different states to recognize and enforce each other's laws. 6 If the
task becomes too onerous or otherwise undesirable, cooperation may break
down. Hence, a choice-of-law system must temper the desire to encourage
recognition of other states' laws with a realistic assessment of the burdens that
cooperation imposes. These burdens include the discomfort or unwillingness
a court may feel if asked to enforce laws contrary to its or its state's
understanding of justice and fairness.
Consider two alternatives for addressing this concern: We could insist
upon rigid enforcement of the choice-of-law rules, without regard for how the
forum views the justice of the applicable law, or we might urge courts to
follow the rules most of the time while leaving them an out when faced with
laws they deem particularly undesirable. In the abstract, it is not obvious which
approach is better. The first alternative maximizes compliance only if states
continue to cooperate. The risk is that some courts, if too often required to
apply laws they deem unjust, may opt out of the system altogether. Defection
by a few states could easily trigger a more widespread breakdown in the
system. The second alternative avoids this hazard by making a public policy
exception available as a sort of safety valve: Courts can preserve their sense
of justice by opting out on a selective basis. This alternative poses a different
danger, namely, that courts will engage in widespread cheating, exploiting the
exception to refuse recognition to foreign laws in too many cases. This, too,
may lead to a breakdown. More likely, it will lead to what game theorists call
a suboptimal equilibrium, in which the system survives but with pervasive
underenforcement.
Obviously, the choice between these alternatives depends on empirical
predictions about how courts will behave under each of them.97 In the
likely is it that the cases parties choose to litigate in the forum will all be at the high-interest end of this
range?
95. What makes a law "most appropriate" is, of course, a matter of considerable controversy. For
present purposes, however, that controversy is beside the point because the argument is equally applicable
to any choice-of-law system. The implications of my argument for different approaches to choice of law
are discussed infra Section II.C.
96. This does not mean that every state must use the same rules or apply those rules identically,
although the greater the uniformity, the more successfully the system as a whole will operate. See Kramer,
Renvoi, supra note 93, at 1021-28.
97. My analysis insists that the public policy doctrine cannot be justified on the ground that it enables
courts to choose the better or more just law. The whole problem in a conflict case is that different states
have made different judgments about what is best, and it is axiomatic that, except as constrained by the
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international context, something like a public policy exception emerged early
and has remained an integral part of the law. As noted above,9s the exception
was incorporated into American practice with no particular thought given to
its propriety in the context of our federal system. It is apparent, however, that
while several features of international litigation may make it sensible to
minimize stress by leaving an escape device in the form of the public policy
exception, the states of the United States are situated differently from the
nations of the world in this respect.
First, the nations of the world have widely disparate cultures and values,
as well as radically inconsistent legal systems. This means that both the
number of cases in which courts are asked to enforce laws they deem unjust
and the extent to which these laws are deemed offensive are likely to be great.
Insisting that courts rigidly enforce choice-of-law rules without regard for the
substantive content of the laws they are asked to enforce could thus generate
a great deal of stress in the system. The states of the United States, in contrast,
share what is, for practical purposes, a single culture. There are, to be sure,
regional differences, but these are more the stuff of late-night TV jokes and
friendly sports rivalries than of armed struggle. Our basic values are widely
shared and, equally important, our legal systems overlap to an extraordinary
degree. Disagreements arise, of course, often with the same intensity as in
international cases, but they arise less frequently and on many fewer issues
than in international relations. This is attributable in part to the federal
Constitution, which takes a number of contentious problems off the table for
individual states and screens out laws inconsistent with widely shared national
values.
Second, the primary glue that holds the international system together is the
self-interest of the nations involved. Particular calculations of self-interest are
not the only ties that bind, but one cannot rely too much on a sense of shared
mission or moral obligation in international relations. Nations will not hesitate
to abandon a cooperative venture if doubts arise about whether it is genuinely
worth their while to adhere to it. The states of the United States, in contrast,
share a strong sense of mission and mutual obligation, at least in comparison
to the international setting. Indeed, few citizens today think of the United
States as anything other than a single political community. While states still
compete with one another, their relations are characterized by a large degree
Constitution, states are coequal sovereigns entitled to make their own value judgments (something I had
thought was settled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Each state is free to define its own
version of the "just" result, and no general law limits or controls any state's power in this regard. Conflicts
thus present competing but equally legitimate versions of what is just. The problem is how best to take into
account the fact that states often disagree, without trashing the whole system The public policy doctrine
is one way to accommodate occasional strong disagreements about policy. The question whether it is a
good one thus cannot be resolved by resort to a general theory of justice, at least not in a mulujunsdictional
system in which not all jurisdictions share the same theory or interpret their theories identically
98. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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of what international theorists call "diffuse reciprocity," a generalized
commitment in which self-interested calculations of expected utility are
replaced by a general willingness to let things play out in the long run.99
Third, no formal enforcement mechanism exists in international law to
prevent nations from defecting. Indeed, nothing prevents defection except the
threat of reciprocal defection. This fact is particularly significant in light of the
first two, which suggest that defections may come easily in the international
context. In the United States, by contrast, an enforcement mechanism other
than the threat of mutual defection is available in the Supreme Court and the
federal government. It may be too much to ask the Court to devise a
comprehensive system of choice-of-law rules. It is not unrealistic, however, to
expect the Court to enforce a simpler pledge to remain within a cooperative
system by prohibiting outright defection and by requiring states to lend each
other a helping hand. Indeed, as the full faith and credit cases demonstrate, the
Court has already recognized its responsibility in this respect.
Given these differences, a public policy exception that may be justifiable
in international cases makes little or no sense in the United States. It is
unnecessary and counterproductive, as well as inconsistent with the premises
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. To prevent states from discriminating in
their treatment of other states' laws based on content may produce some small
amount of stress, but not nearly enough to justify tolerating the widespread
cheating that the public policy doctrine invites.
This analysis suggests that there is a difference between domestic and
international cases, one that would allow (though not require) state courts to
treat the laws of other nations differently than they treat the laws of sister
states. The distinction is, I believe, fully justified by the dissimilar settings I
have outlined. Nor is there anything unusual about treating international cases
differently. Such differences are familiar in choice of law, as illustrated, for
example, by rules allowing courts to take judicial notice of the laws of other
states while requiring proof of the laws of foreign nations.10 As a
constitutional matter, moreover, we should recall that the "very purpose" of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause was "to alter the status of the several states as
independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under
the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them
integral parts of a single nation."' 0 ' The relationship among the states is
supposed to be different.
99. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER 134-49 (1989);
Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983).
100. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of
Conflicts, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 602, 605 (1975).
101. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
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Perhaps the most serious objection to my argument that the public policy
doctrine violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause is Justice Scalia's protest that
a practice, constitutional at the Founding and in constant use since then, cannot
suddenly become unconstitutional. 12 The argument is a variation of the
standard refrain about a countermajoritarian difficulty, stronger in the sense
that Scalia offers continuous usage as a sort of popular reaffirmation that
makes judicial interference even tougher to justify. Yet the apparent
applicability of this argument to the public policy doctrine is deceptive. There
was, to be sure, a principle bearing some resemblance to the public policy
doctrine already in existence in 1789. It was, however, a distant forebear at
best-not yet named, limited to dismissal for want of jurisdiction, and
narrowly confined in scope. The widespread use of a formal "public policy
exception" as a ground for applying forum law is, in fact, of much more recent
vintage."'
Even where it applies, moreover, the argument from tradition is easily
overstated. A long pedigree naturally will cause any conscientious judge to
hesitate before declaring a practice unconstitutional-and so it should. Yet
pedigree alone cannot pose an insurmountable barrier in the face of a strong
challenge based on precedent and principle. Judges are supposed to interpret
and apply the law in a way that maintains consistency with its spirit and
purpose as well as its letter and form. We call them judges because we expect
them to exercise judgment. Otherwise, we could just turn the justice system
over to a well-programmed computer. Exercising judgment carries with it an
obligation to interpret laws in conformity with changing circumstances;
standing still while everything else changes is either ignorance or orneriness,
not fidelity to law. And this interpretive obligation extends to changing values
and understandings as well as material circumstances.' Whatever role the
102. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip. 499 U.S I. 35-36 (1991) (Scaha. J. concurrng in
judgment) (discussing jury discretion in awarding punitive damages). see alto Burnham v Superior Court.
495 U.S. 604 (1990) (discussing transient jurisdicuon); Sun Oil Co. v. Wonman. 486 U S 717 (1988)
(applying forum statute of limitations).
103. Joseph Story's Commentaries, for example, makes no reference to a public policy doctrine Cases
that turn on considerations similar to those encompassed by the public policy doctrine are. instead.
presented as particular exceptions to general rules. There are relauvely few such exceptions in the treatise,
and Justice Story urges readers to keep it that way. See STOR1Y. supra note 10. at 205-26 (discussing
exceptions to place of celebration rule for mamages); td. at 371-72 (discussing exceptions to rule that
contract is valid if valid in place where made). A general "public policy" exception that cuts across rules
seems not to have achieved recognition until sometime in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.
after which time discussions of the doctrine become more common. See. e g. ERNI-sT G LORIE N.
SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 12-17 (1947) (citing authorities) As late as 1934,
however, the Restatement was still describing the public policy exception as -extremely limited." while
emphasizing that courts invoking it dismiss without rendering a decision on the merits See RESTATMNT
OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 612 cmts. a. c (1934)
104. Examples here could be multiplied almost without end Think of Roe % Wade. 410 US 113
(1973), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Gideon i lVaimnuright. 372 U S 335 ( 1963. and Broun
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, (1954). to name but a lew of the most well.knos n cases For present
purposes, Erie R.R. v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). provides a particularly apt illustration A cornerstone
of the modem federal system, Erie held that Si iftv Tyson. 41 U S (16 Pet ) I (1842). was unconstitutional
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public policy doctrine may once have played, or however much sense it may
once have made, no longer matters. The doctrine has evolved into something
different from what it was at the start, expanding even as it became more
incompatible with our growing sense of what states owe each other. It no
longer makes sense.
C. Implications for Choice-of-Law Analysis
To say that the public policy exception is unconstitutional is already to
propose a fairly substantial change in the law. But the premise for the
exception's unconstitutionality has broader implications that need to be
examined as well. Recall the argument: Full faith and credit prohibits states
from basing choice-of-law decisions on the desirability or obnoxiousness of
other states' policies. Thus stated, the principle appears to threaten a great deal
of modem choice-of-law doctrine in addition to the public policy exception.
In fact, the consequences of accepting the argument are considerably less
catastrophic.
Conflicts scholars like to describe the choice-of-law revolution0 5 as a
victory for "policy analysis," which is why a principle that appears to prohibit
policy-based choices seems so ominous. If modem choice-of-law analysis asks
courts to make policy-based choices, however, it does so in a special and
insofar as it authorized federal courts to make their own determinations of common law in diversity cases,
Yet Swift was consistent with the understanding of the common law that prevailed when the Constitution
was adopted and was unquestionably constitutional when it was decided (which is why we did not hear
states' righters howling about federal usurpation at the time). See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 53, at
591-92; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1365,1401-08 (1997). Moreover,
the practice Swift endorsed was continuous and, if anything, still spreading in 1938. Was the Court wrong
to overrule Swift? Of course not. However much sense Swift may once have made, changes in our
understanding of the common law and the federal system made it an unhealthy anomaly that needed to be
put to rest. So too the public policy doctrine.
105. Readers unfamiliar with these developments in choice of law will find a useful summary In LEA
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS chs. 1-2 (2d ed. 1995). The
basic story is well-known, however, for it is the familiar tale of the abandonment of formalism for realism.
Traditional choice-of-law doctrine offered a paradigmatic example of what we have come to call (after
Roscoe Pound) "mechanical jurisprudence." It consisted of broad rules derived from an abstract theory
(here, of territoriality) and applied without consideration for functional objectives or consequences. This
doctrine was subjected to devastating criticism from progressive and realist scholars in the early years of
the twentieth century, the gist of which underscored the need to analyze choice-of-law problems in terms
of consequences for the policies at stake. But whereas the implications of this critique were absorbed
gradually in most fields from the turn of the century through the 1950s, choice of law remained curiously
static. It was not until the early 1960s that courts began finally to abandon the traditional choice-of-law
rules; first honors here are typically awarded to the New York Court of Appeals for its opinion in Babcock
v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). See Symposium on Conflict of Laws: Celebrating the 30th
Anniversary of Babcock v. Jackson, 56 At.B. L. REV. 693 (1993). After Babcock, change came rapidly.
Scholars had already proposed a variety of new approaches to choice of law, and each of these soon found
adherents in the courts of a few states. In less than a decade, the choice-of-law landscape was completely
transformed. A common feature of all these new approaches was the abandonment of formal rules for some
kind of functional analysis that takes choice-of-law policies into account together with the policies
underlying the substantive laws in conflict. Hence scholars refer to a choice-of-law "revolution" marked
by the acceptance of some form of policy analysis.
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limited sense of the term. The problem with traditional choice-of-law rules was
that they were policy blind. Each rule selected a contact to determine the
applicable law for a particular type of controversy, but the contact was not
chosen for its relationship to any substantive policies underlying the law in
such controversies, and whatever tendency it had to advance these policies was
coincidental.
Take, for example, the traditional place of injury rule in tort cases, which
provides that the law where the plaintiff was injured shall determine the
parties' rights and liabilities with respect to all of the substantive issues in a
case. The choice of the place of injury had nothing to do with tort policy but
was based on classic formalist logic: The cause of action necessarily arose at
the place where the tort was completed, and "[t]he tort is complete only when
the harm takes place, for this is the last event necessary to make the actor
liable."'  Now suppose that a married couple from Texas has an accident
in California, and the question is whether one spouse can sue the other. Both
states presumably have rules governing this situation; suppose, for instance,
that Texas permits such suits while California bars them. Each state's rule
reflects the judgment of that state's lawmakers about how best to regulate
intrafamilial relations and the likelihood of fraud or collusion-policies that are
implicated if the couple resides in the state, without regard for where they
were injured. The application of California law to bar the suit under the place
of injury rule thus frustrates Texas policy while serving no legitimate
California interest, and is utterly senseless.
The familiar critique of traditional choice-of-law rules for failing to take
policy considerations of this sort into account was developed decades ago, with
great thoroughness, by realist and legal process scholars."°1 As one might
have expected, their advice was to do the opposite: to base choice-of-law
decisions on the way in which a state's contacts with a case implicate choice-
of-law policies and the policies underlying each state's potentially applicable
laws. Brainerd Currie led the way, developing the first workable alternative to
106. HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93 (3d ed. 1949) Tbe court
in Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, II So. 803 (1892). explained:
The fact which created the right to sue.-the injury.-without which confessedly no action
would lie anywhere, transpired in the state of Mississippi. It was in that state. therefore.
necessarily that the cause of action, if any, arose; and whether a cause of action ar s and
existed at all, or not, must in all reason be determined by [that law].
Id. at 806; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 377 (1934) As I have elsewhere
pointed out, even the formal reasoning behind this rule is fallacious. See Larry Kramer, Vesriges of Beale
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179. 190 n.36 ("The last event test is
arbitrary because there is no claim unless all the elements are established. A tort may be consummated
where the last act occurs, but it is being commirted from the first to the last act and thus 'occurs' at all
these places.").
107. See supra note 105. The classic treatments include COOK. supra note 62; LORENZEN. supra note
103; David F. Cavers, A Critique of tie Choice-of.Law Problem. 47 HARV. L. RE.. 173 (1933); and. of
course, Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict.of.Lawvs Afetlod. 25 U CHI. L.
RE'.. 227 (1958).
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the traditional rules with his "governmental interest analysis."' 8 Currie was
followed by others who built on the same insights but developed quite different
approaches: the "most significant relationship" test of the Second
Restatement, 0 9 Baxter's "comparative impairment" analysis,"0 Leflar's
"choice-influencing considerations,""' Cavers's "principles of
108. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at chs. 1-4. Under this approach, a court is supposed to ascertain the
purposes served by each state's law and ask which state has contacts that implicate the purposes of that
law; a state that has such contacts is said to have a "governmental interest" in the case (commentators today
just say "interest") and thus a legitimate claim to have its law applied. If only one state is interested, the
case presents a "false conflict," and the law of the only interested state applies. If more than one state Is
interested, the case presents a more difficult "true conflict." After much agonizing, Currie concluded that
true conflicts should normally be decided by applying the law of the forum, as should cases in which no
state is interested (called "unprovided for" cases) and in which a true conflict is litigated in a disinterested
forum.
Currie has been criticized for emphasizing the policies underlying substantive laws to the exclusion
of more general choice-of-law policies, like minimizing forum shopping and enhancing uniformity and
predictability. See Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of.Law
Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 938 (1975). Currie does, in fact, take such multistate policies into
account when it comes to resolving true conflicts, though concededly he did not place much stock In them
or give them much weight. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 52-53; Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third
State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963) (arguing that many true conflicts can be resolved by
taking "moderate and restrained" second look).
109. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr oF LAWS (1971). Section 6 of the Second Restatement
says to decide each issue in a case according to the law of the place with the "most significant relationship"
to that issue, as determined by a long list of factors. The factors include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6. The Second Restatement includes a multitude of rules designed to identify the state likely to have
this "most significant relationship" in any given situation, but these are mere presumptions and may be
ignored if the court determines that some other state has a more significant relationship under section 6.
By far the most widely used alternative to the traditional rules, see CRAMTON Er AL., supra note 53, at 132,
the Second Restatement has been harshly criticized by academic commentators. See, e.g., Larry Kramer,
COice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465,
486-87 (1991) ("[O]ne needs to read a lot of opinions in a single sitting fully to appreciate just how badly
the Second Restatement works in practice."); Laycock, supra note 25, at 253 ("Trying to be all things to
all people, it produced mush."); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 77 (1989) ("The
Second Restatement's silence regarding the priority of [section 6] policies mystifies rather than
clarifies .... ).
110. See Baxter, supra note 55. In this insightful article, Baxter asks what would happen if lawmakers
from two states were to negotiate a multistate agreement on the respective application of their laws in
conflict cases. He then reasons that courts can replicate the likely outcome of such multistate negotiations
with a principle of "comparative impairment": "to subordinate, in the particular case, the external objective
of the state whose internal objective will be least impaired in general scope and impact by subordination
in cases like the one at hand." Id. at 18. A state's "internal objective" is the policy that led the state to
enact a law for domestic cases; a state's "external objective" is its desire to extend that law to multistate
cases that implicate the state's internal objective. See id. at 17. In other words, Baxter concludes that courts
should resolve conflicts by applying the law of the state whose domestic policy would be more Impaired
if that state's law were not applied. This approach, Baxter argues, maximizes the likelihood that each state's
law will be applied in the cases that are most important to it. See id, at 8-10. Baxter's analysis has been
adopted by the courts in California. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720-21 (Cal. 1976);
Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the
California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 577, 577 (1980).
111. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267
(1966). After examining cases to ascertain the "true" reasons for decision, Leflar produced a list of five
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preference,"" 2 and so on.
Significantly, with the sole exception of Leflar, these new theories were
all carefully constructed to make sure that choice-of-law decisions would not
turn on judgments about the desirability or obnoxiousness of the conflicting
substantive policies. They were, or tried to be-dare I say it?-policy neutral.
Thus, unlike the blind choices made by traditional rules, choices under these
new theories are indeed policy based inasmuch as they turn on whether a
state's contacts affect relevant substantive and choice-of-law policies. But this
does not include asking whose substantive policy is preferable or superior from
some external perspective. On the contrary, pains were taken to ensure that this
not be a basis for resolving conflicts.
Currie, for example, argued that a law should apply only if the state's
contacts relate to the law's underlying domestic policies: If a law serves
compensatory interests, the question is whether one of the parties is from the
state; if the law seeks to encourage or discourage particular conduct, the
question is whether the conduct at issue took place within the state, and so
forth. In this sense, certainly, interest analysis is policy based. But Currie went
to great lengths to emphasize that it was inappropriate to resolve cases in
which more than one state has such contacts (so-called true conflicts) by
assessing the relative merit of their respective substantive policies. Hence, he
"choice-influencing considerations" that he claimed encompassed the factors used to determine choice-of-
law results. These are: (1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of the interstate and international order;
(3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests (including its
interest in doing justice by sometimes applying another state's law): and (5) application of the better rule
of law. See id. at 282. Because of this last factor, by far the most controversial. Leflar's method is often
called the "better law" approach. It has been adopted by courts in six states: Arkansas. Hawaii. Minnesota.
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See CRA1sTON ET AL.. supra note 53. at 217 In practice,
courts that follow Leflar's approach resolve most cases without relying on or emphasizing the better law
factor. When this factor does come into play, judges ask such questions as whether a law is anachronistic
(measured by what other states are doing), and whether it is over- or underinclusive tn the way it achteves
its stated ends. Unavoidably, at least some cases that turn on better law analysts require the court to make
a straightforward value judgment about the desirability of the respective substantive policies- See. e g.
Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (Minn. 1973) ("In our search for the better rule. we are firmly
convinced of the superiority of the common law rule of liability to that of the Ontario guest statute ")
112. See DAVID F. CAVERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS (1965). Cavers articulated a series of seven
"principles of preference" to use in resolving conflicts. with respect to tort actions, for example. Cavers's
first principle provides that the law of the place of injury should apply if it is more protective of the
plaintiff than the law of the states in which the defendant resides or acted. See id. at 139-45 Hts second
principle, a corollary of the first, provides that the law of the state where a defendant acted and caused
injury should apply if it is less protective than the law of the plaintiff's home state. See id at 146-59 Both
principles are justified on the basis of the parties' reasonable expectations. Other tort pnnciples deal with
cases in which one state imposes "special controls" over particular conduct within its borders, such as
blasting or the sale of liquor (apply that state's law), see id. at 159-66, and cases in which parties have
established a relationship of some sort, such as the purchase of a ticket (apply the law of the "seat" of this
relationship if it is more protective of plaintiffs than the law of the place of injury). see id at 166-76.
Cavers takes care to indicate that these principles do not consutute a complete choice-of-law system and
that he is merely offering a guide with which to develop additional rules. For a case in which Cavers's
principles of preference played a central role, see Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854. 856-57 (Pa. 1970).
which relies on Cavers's second principle to preclude recovery under a Delaware guest statute in an action
brought by a Pennsylvania guest against his Delaware host for an injury incurred in Delaware
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eventually concluded, the only safe solution is to apply forum law."3
The few judges and theorists who follow Currie's approach have
consistently adhered to this advice. 14 A much larger number embraced
Currie's basic insights but were not persuaded to adopt his alternative solution
to true conflicts. So they looked for other answers, but answers that, like
Currie's, did not turn on substantive policy preferences. Baxter's "comparative
impairment" analysis and Cavers's "principles of preference," for example, are
both best understood as efforts to resolve true conflicts without an automatic
forum preference but still on grounds other than declaring one state's
substantive policy to be better or more desirable." 5 This is true also of my
own efforts to resolve conflicts by developing tie-breaking canons." 6 Even
courts and commentators who struck out in different directions-lex fori,
significant contacts, center of gravity, and the like" 7-- were always careful
113. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 117-21, 181-82.
114. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 546 (Or. 1964); Henna Hill Kay, A Defense of
Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 151-52 (1989); Robert A. Sedler,
Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics', 34
MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983). In later work, Currie modified his approach to recognize the appropriateness
of reexamining forum law "with a view to a more moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy
and of the circumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate the forum's legitimate purpose." Currie,
supra note 108, at 757. Even here, Currie was careful to avoid judgments about the relative merits of the
conflicting policies. Hence, he offers Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961), as a "brilliant[]"
example of the sort of inquiry he had in mind. See Currie, supra note 108, at 757. In Bernkrant, Justice
Traynor resolved an apparent true conflict between California and Nevada law by concluding that California
would not apply its law because the particular facts made it reasonable for the parties to assume that
Nevada law applied (the parties were all Nevada residents at the time of the transaction). See 360 P.2d at
909.
115. See supra notes 110, 112.
116. See Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 93, at 315-38; Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 93, at 1015-21.
This work reinterprets and modifies Baxter's comparative impairment analysis, discussed supra note 110.
Because Baxter asked judges to make a determination that is too complex and difficult to be practical, I
proposed instead to develop a set of "policy-selecting" rules or canons that would direct courts to choose
the law that reflects a generally shared policy or policy preference. In this way, all states may
systematically advance their more important interests. These rules are not based on value judgments about
which rules are normatively superior. Indeed, they are specifically designed to avoid such inquiries. Take
the canon that where one of two conflicting laws is obsolete, the other law should be applied. See Kramer,
Rethinking, supra note 93, at 334. This could be read to assume that nonobsolete laws are substantively
preferable to obsolete ones, and so some readers appear to have misunderstood it; I defined obsolete to
mean "inconsistent with prevailing legal and social norms in the state that enacted it" (as opposed to
inconsistent with norms prevailing in other states) precisely to avoid such judgments. Id. The assumption
is that laws that are obsolete in this restricted sense probably remain on the books as a matter of Inertia;
to the extent such laws reflect any policy at all, it is a weak, vestigial commitment. Moreover, every state
has some laws that are obsolete in this sense, and these laws are bound to come into conflict from time to
time with the nonobsolete laws of other states. If I am right that obsolete laws represent weakly-held
policies, then every state is better off if it resolves such conflicts by applying the nonobsolcte law, since
in the long run such a rule will systematically advance the more strongly-held policies of all states. See id,
at 335-36.
117. These approaches are variations of the more weli-known approaches discussed above. See supra
notes 108-12. Lexfori calls for application of forum law whenever the forum has contacts sufficient to
make this constitutional. See BRILMAYER, supra note 73, at 361-66; cf. ALBERT EHRENzWEIO, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 349-51 (1962) (recognizing exceptions only for universally shared "true rules" revealed by results
in decided cases). The "significant contacts" and "center of gravity" approaches, in contrast, are variations
on the Second Restatement; like the Restatement, both direct the judge to ask which state has the "most
significant" contacts, but in a way that is less systematized and more fact-bound. See CRAMTON ET AL.,
1996
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to avoid comparative evaluations of the intrinsic worthiness of the policies at
issue.
Not every modem approach shares this commitment to resolving conflicts
without evaluating the merit of different states' substantive policies. In
particular, evaluations of this sort are made by courts and commentators
employing some version of "better law" analysis.' 8 If my interpretation of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is right, this inquiry is (or ought to be
deemed) unconstitutional. But before conflict-of-laws mavens begin sputtering,
note how insignificant the practical consequences of this would be, even in the
six states that use a better law approach." 9 For in none of these states is the
"better law" inquiry made in every case. It is, rather, a final step, reached only
after the judge concludes that a case cannot be resolved on the basis of other
"choice-influencing" considerations, none of which is affected by my
argument. Because these other considerations dispose of the vast majority of
cases in practice, eliminating "better law" analysis will have only marginal
effects on choice of law.
Two observations put the relevant lessons here into perspective. First,
because most choice-of-law analysis does not ask about the desirability or
obnoxiousness of other states' policies, my argument that full faith and credit
prohibits states from making choice-of-law decisions on this basis leaves
existing doctrine relatively undisturbed. The public policy exception should no
longer be used, of course, and better law analysis similarly ought to be found
unconstitutional. Yet while these are not insignificant changes, choice-of-law
methodology can for the most part continue to develop just as it has for the
past century. Second, the very fact that courts and commentators have tried so
hard to avoid making choice-of-law decisions turn on evaluative judgments
about substantive policy provides strong support for my argument. Most
commentators, to be sure, have not seen the problem in constitutional terms.
But the argument for making it constitutional-suggested by cases like Hughes
and Broderick and motivated by the core values of full faith and credit-is
straightforward. That virtually everyone who works in the field recognizes the
inappropriateness of making choices turn on such evaluations is a lesson worth
keeping in mind.
supra note 53, at 117-18; Symeon C. Symeonides. Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1995: A Year
in Review, 44 AM. J. CoMP. L. 181, 193-94 (1996). Courts that employ these approaches someumes talk
about "balancing" interests, but this means evaluating which state has closer or stronger connecutons, not
whose law is better. Such balancing can be faulted for being unprincipled. nonanalytic. even incoherent.
But it does not turn on substantive policy preferences and so does not suffer from the infirmity condemned
in this Article.
118. See supra note I11. Other commentators who have adopted forms of better law analysts include
Singer, supra note 109; and Friedrich K. Juenger. A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 Am. J ComaP. L. 1
(1984).
119. See supra note 111.
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D. Implications for Marriage Cases
What consequences does the argument portend for marriage cases in
particular? We saw in Part I that courts tend to follow the place of celebration
rule pretty much without regard for how they resolve other choice-of-law
problems, and that the public policy exception is the ground most often used
to deny recognition to marriages performed elsewhere. It follows that, under
existing law, public policy will almost certainly be the basis for invalidating
same-sex marriages performed legally in Hawaii.
One effect of my argument, then, is to constrain the ability of states to
invalidate same-sex marriages without somehow changing their choice-of-law
rules for marriage generally. This is true whether states express the desire to
deny recognition by statute or by judicial decision, since the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is equally binding on state legislatures. More important, it is true
whether states adopt an express exception for same-sex marriages or instead
invent ways to accomplish the same end without openly saying so, for the
constitutional prohibition similarly reaches facially valid rules adopted for an
improper purpose. 20
Thus, a state could not apply an ostensibly non-content-based marriage
evasion statute only to same-sex marriages. Nor could a state's lawmakers
simply replace their broad rule governing "marriage" with more discrete rules
for particular marriages in a way designed to single out the law of particular
states for discriminatory treatment-adopting, for example, a place of
celebration rule for opposite-sex marriages and a place of domicile rule for
same-sex marriages. Insofar as such rules are designed to recognize other
states' laws except where these validate same-sex marriages, attempting to do
by subterfuge what the state is forbidden to do openly, they too would be
unconstitutional.'2'
How should we expect states to respond to this new regime? Some states
might give up their plans to single out same-sex marriages celebrated lawfully
in Hawaii, sticking with the place of celebration rule even without a public
policy escape device. Others probably will adopt one of the modem approaches
120. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
121. Apart from this, states remain free to rewrite their choice-of-law rules as they please. A state
could adopt, for example, a place of celebration rule for marriage formalities (such as which officials are
entitled to perform a wedding, how many witnesses are required, and the like) while applying domiciliary
law to determine the substantive right to marry. This distinction is easily defended on grounds similar to
the nearly universal rule that a forum's procedures apply even when the parties' substantive rights are
governed by another state's law. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971). It
is difficult, by way of comparison, to think of a nondiscriminatory justification for adopting a place of
celebration rule for opposite-sex couples while applying domiciliary law to same-sex couples. In any event,
the issue in each case is whether the state's rule or practice is intended selectively to discriminate in its
willingness to recognize another state's law depending on the law's content. This assessment will turn on
what the state's conflicts law looked like before a change was made, and on the reasons offered for
changing it, and, of course, on the extent to which it actually discriminates in practice.
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to choice of law for marriage cases. At present, these approaches generally are
confined to tort and/or contract cases in the states that use them.' -2 They
could, however, easily be extended to marriage cases. This would lead, in the
ordinary course of things, to nonrecognition of some Hawaiian marriages
without the need to invoke public policy. Under conventional interest analysis,
for example, the case of a couple from state X who travelled to Hawaii to get
married is a false conflict, governed by the law of their common domicile.
If so, so be it. For while the application of modem conflicts analysis might
lead to nonrecognition of some marriages, it would eliminate the problem of
selective discrimination based solely on the disfavored content of another
state's law. Hawaii should not be able to dictate marriage law to the rest of the
nation, nor can it do so. Unlike the divorce problems that plagued choice of
law in the 1940s and 1950s,' 23 celebrating a marriage does not produce a
judgment or final judicial decree closed to collateral attack. States retain the
power to regulate the marriages of domiciliaries according to their own
dictates, including the power to adopt choice-of-law rules establishing the
circumstances in which another state's law will apply. The only limitation
proposed here is that, if a state adopts a choice-of-law practice that recognizes
marriages celebrated elsewhere, the rule or approach it uses cannot be designed
or selectively manipulated to disfavor particular laws because their content is
deemed especially odious. Whether a state refines its traditional rules or adopts
some form of modem analysis for marriage cases, the state's courts must apply
that approach without basing their decisions on whether or how strongly they
disapprove of a particular state's policy.'1
2
III. THE POWER OF CONGRESS
There is a further complication. Part II argued that states cannot make an
exception to their ordinary choice-of-law rules when those rules say to apply
Hawaii law just because they dislike Hawaii's policy choices. Anticipating
such an argument, opponents of gay and lesbian marriage went to Congress for
permission. Congress responded with the Defense of Marriage Act, which
122. See Symeonides, supra note 117, at 193-203.
123. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 53, at 474-75.
124. It is, of course, possible to think of cases in which the rule proposed here would either limit or
prohibit practices that seem reasonable. An obvious example is the usury cases, in which states enforce
usury laws of other states if (and only if) their permissible interest rates do not greatly exceed forum rates
Cf 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 203 (1971) (describing rules for usury) This does
not trouble me much. Like other legal rules, rules of constitutional law inevitably impose costs as well as
benefits, and the rule proposed here is no different. On the whole. I have no doubt that the costs-o the
values of full faith and credit and to the goals of minimizing parochialism and maximizing interstate
cooperation-of permitting selective discrimination of the sor discussed here far exceed the likely benefits
from sensible use of the practice in a few instances. For a contrary view, see Linda J Silberman. Can the
Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Saine-Sex Marriage and Federalism Values. 16
QUtNNIPtAC L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
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purports to authorize states to do what I just argued the Full Faith and Credit
Clause prohibits."z Section 2 of DOMA provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.12 6
This is radical stuff. By parroting the language of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, section 2 literally repeals it for same-sex marriage cases. Not only can
a state decline to recognize a marriage of its domiciliaries who went to Hawaii
for the weekend, but it also can refuse to recognize the marriage of a same-sex
couple who left Hawaii after many years of being lawfully married there. Of
course, existing law already permits this much (though, for the reasons
explained in Part II, it should not). But section 2 goes further and permits one
state to ignore another state's laws recognizing same-sex marriages in more
troubling circumstances, such as when one spouse dies leaving property in the
state. Existing law may allow this too. Existing law does not, however, allow
one state to refuse recognition to the final judgment of another state's
courts. 2 7 DOMA does-it expressly authorizes states to ignore even
judgments involving the marital rights or status of a same-sex couple. All bets
are off for these people, and no divorce decree, property settlement, or
adoption is safe.
Can the national legislature really do this? Congress purported to act under
the second half of Article IV, section 1, which says, "And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."' 8 For those who like
125. In addition to relieving states of the obligation to give faith and credit in same-sex marriage
cases, DOMA defines marriage for purposes of federal law (including eligibility for federal benefits
programs) as "a legal union between one man and one woman." Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
199, § 3(a), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2419, 2419 (to be codified at I U.S.C. § 7). This provision
raises some interesting problems in its own right. Most important, it departs from a uniform and
longstanding policy of allowing states to define what constitutes a family and, for the first time, creates a
federal law of marriage-ironic for a law justified in the name of states' rights. In addition, because state
and federal law interact in so many ways, DOMA will make it difficult for states and communities that
recognize same-sex marriage to administer their family and tax laws in an even-handed way. See Herma
Hill Kay, Same-Sex Marriage in the Conflict of Laws: A Critique of the Proposed "Defense of Marriage
Act", in THE CIVIL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 902 (1997).
126. Defense of Marriage Act § (2)(a).
127. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1933) (holding that Full Faith and Credit
Clause applies to unalterable decrees of alimony for minor child); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S, 230, 237
(1908) (holding that Full Faith and Credit Clause applies even when first state court judgment was for claim
that could not have been enforced in second state's courts). A very narrow public policy exception, too
narrow for same-sex marriages but still unconstitutional in my view, is recognized in I RESTATEM T
(SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 103 (1971).
128. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
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to play with texts, this so-called Effects Clause provides a splendid opportunity
for exegetics: What are "general Laws"? Do "Acts, Records and Proceedings"
include common law decisions or just statutes? Does the Clause apply only to
how laws and judgments are proved, or can Congress prescribe substantive
rules as well? Each of these questions has, in fact, produced its fair share of
commentary over the years.' 29  There is, however, "a substantial
consensus"' 30 today that, whatever mysteries remain, the Effects Clause does
indeed authorize Congress to make binding choice-of-law rules for the
states.' Yet this consensus is confined to Congress's power to enact choice-
of-law rules at all. No one has ever found it necessary to ask just how far
Congress can go, because Congress has never legislated even a single choice-
of-law rule for states. 132 (Note how extraordinary DOMA is in this light:
Congress was content to let the states slug it out on issues like slavery,
miscegenation, divorce, and abortion-but this, it seems, goes too far.) We are
dealing with a completely open question, one never addressed by any court or
analyzed in depth by any scholar: 33 Is Congress's power under the Effects
129. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 28 YALE LJ. 421, 432-34 (1919) (arguing that Clause applies to legislative acts as well as
judgments); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-
Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 33, 71-80 (1957) (arguing that Clause is limited to judgments);
Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) (arguing that Clause is merely rule of evidence governing proof of
foreign laws and judgments).
130. See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swonp: The Case for Federal Clwice of Law
Statutes, 80 GEo. L.J. 1, 28 (1991).
131. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 125; Laycock. supra note 25, at 301 The Supreme Court has
indicated in dictum that it believes Congress has this power. See Sun Oil Co v Wonman. 486 U S 717,
729 (1988).
132. The rare legislative efforts in this area have, for the most pan, been largely confined to specifying
the effects of sister-state judgments. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1738A, 1738B (1994) In addition. §§ 1731-37
and §§ 1739-46 deal with proof of various sons of public records. Finally. Congress has occasionally
adopted choice-of-law provisions in connection with issues of federal law. See. e g , id § 1316(b) (directing
that tort actions against United States be governed by law of place where act or omission occurred); id §§
1604-05 (defining circumstances in which foreign sovereign is entitled to immunity); 42 U S C. §§
2000e(f), 2000e-l (1994) (defining extraterritorial scope of 'ifle VII) Prior to DOMA. how ever. Congress
had never exercised its power under the Effects Clause either to enact a choice-of-law provision for
ordinary state law disputes or to relieve states of any obligations imposed on them by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.
133. Paul Freund touched on the issue of limits on Congress's power to prescribe rules for recognizing
judgments in his superb article on the process jurisprudence of Chief Justice Stone See Paul A Freund.
Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REv 1210 (1946) Discussing the Court's
opinion in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). which held that Louisiana violated the
Full Faith and Credit Clause by awarding supplementary benefits to a worker who had already obtained
relief from the Texas Industrial Accident Board, Freund asked "[wihether Congress could legislate under
the full faith and credit clause to restore the practice adopted by the Louisiana courts." Freund. supra, at
1229. "[D]oubtful" he concluded, asserting without elaboration that "legislation enlarging the compulsory
area of full faith and credit" may be permissible, but "legislation withdrawing from the compulsory area
what the Court has held is encompassed by the constitutional mandate may stand on a different footing."
Id. at 1229-30. Justice Stevens cited this passage in a footnote of his plurality opinion in Thomas v
Wasltington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980). observing that
while Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State
must accord to the laws or judgments of another State, there is at least some question whether
Congress may cut back on the measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this Court.
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Clause plenary, or does the Full Faith and Credit Clause impose limits that
bind Congress as well as the states? For constitutional law aficionados, the
question may be put thus: Is Congress's power under the Effects Clause more
like its power under the dormant Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment?
If asked, most commentators today would probably favor the commerce
power analogy.1 34 On this view, the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes
certain judicially defined limits on states, analogous to limits imposed under
the dormant Commerce Clause. These have the status of federal common law
and can thus be displaced by Congress, which has nearly unlimited power
under the Effects Clause to prescribe alternative rules. Hence, a state violates
the Full Faith and Credit Clause by applying its law without a legitimate
interest, and also, if I am right, by refusing to apply another state's law on
public policy grounds. If Congress decides differently, however, it has power
under the Effects Clause to authorize states to take these otherwise prohibited
steps. On this view of Congress's power, then, DOMA is constitutional.
It is certainly possible to construct an argument to support this
interpretation of the Effects Clause. Everyone agrees that requiring full faith
and credit is supposed to reduce interstate conflict and foster an attitude of
friendly cooperation among the states. With these objects in mind, the Supreme
Court has defined certain minimal responsibilities that states owe to each other
in terms of recognizing and respecting each other's laws. Yet the Court's
judgment that these are necessary or desirable obligations could be wrong; they
could even be counterproductive, increasing rather than decreasing centrifugal
tendencies within the Union. Obviously, no individual state could be trusted
to make such a determination. But Congress is in a different position. Not only
does it share the Court's national perspective, but its ability to conduct
factfinding and gauge the effects of alternative rules is superior to that of the
Court. It thus makes sense to read the constitutional text as conferring plenary
authority on Congress to be the final arbiter of what full faith and credit
Id. at 273 n.18 (citation omitted); see also Edward S. Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U.
PA. L. REV. 371, 373-74 (1933) (discussing congressional legislation under Clause).
These authorities deal specifically with judgments, which in most contexts receive greater
constitutional protection than laws (though, as indicated above, DOMA also raises ajudgments issue). The
only reference I have found in the literature to the question of limits on Congress's power to regulate full
faith and credit to laws is in Nadelmann, supra note 129, at 83. Observing that Congress's addition of the
word "full" to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 in 1952 could be read to "narrow down" the statute's command,
Nadelmann asserts without explanation that "[tlo the extent that the Full Faith and Credit clause is self-
executing, any such narrowing down would have to be discarded as in contravention of the command by
the Constitution." Id.
134. As no one has yet written on the question, I base this assertion on conversations with colleagues,
many of whom were surprised by the suggestion that DOMA was beyond the power of Congress. Michael
McConnell has developed the argument to some extent in a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1740, 104th Cong. 56-58 (1996) (letter from
Professor Michael W. McConnell, University of Chicago Law School, to Senator Orrin 0. Hatch).
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requires, with power to specify when particular laws should or should not be
applied by other states.
There are a number of problems with this interpretation, which I was
originally inclined to accept. To begin, the text of the Clause says that full
faith and credit shall be given in each state to the laws and judgments of every
other state. It does not say that states shall give faith and credit, but rather that
faith and credit shall be given-a use of passive voice that makes this a
general command rather than one directed solely at state lawmakers. It does
not say that only some faith and credit need be given, but rather that the faith
and credit given shall be full. This unqualified "full" and mandatory "shall"
lose some (though obviously not all) of their meaning if Congress can simply
legislate the requirement away or relieve states of whatever obligations the Full
Faith and Credit Clause imposes. It may not be impossible to read the Effects
Clause as empowering Congress to do just that, but if that is what the drafters
meant, they chose a peculiarly roundabout way of saying so. 3 '
Given its language, it is more credible to read the Full Faith and Credit
Clause as imposing a mandatory requirement of faith and credit (defined by
the Supreme Court), with the Effects Clause authorizing Congress to enact
whatever national legislation is needed to refine and implement it. Refine and
implement, not undermine or abolish-which means that even federal
legislation must be tested against, and shown to be consistent with, the core
requirements of full faith and credit.
The legislative history, such as it is, tends to support this textual inference.
Some evidence is found in the records of the Federal Convention, though the
legal relevance of such evidence is doubtful.'36 A preliminary version of the
135. My research assistant, Sarah Coyne, points out that this peculiarity is more pronounced given the
placement of the power to make choice-of-law rules in Article IV, rather than with Congress's other general
powers in Article I, Section 8. In terms of structure and placement, the Effects Clause is thus most closely
analogous to Article II's Exceptions Clause, which authorizes Congress to make exceptions to the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction and which most commentators agree gives Congress only limited power. See
Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marrage Act is Unconstitutional 30-31 (Oct-
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
136. The tendency to treat the debates in Philadelphia as the best evidence of original understanding
is puzzling (to say the least). The Convention had no power to enact anything, and the precise course of
its deliberations was unknown to those who did. To treat the Framers' expressions behind closed doors as
authoritative is like relying on the understanding of the law clerk who drafted an opinion or the
speechwriter who wrote the President's State of the Union Address. Evidence from the Federal Convention
should matter insofar as its proceedings were made public and played a role in the subsequent debate over
ratification. But the Framers were generally pretty good about keeping their pledge of secrecy (with the
notorious but relatively harmless exception of Luther Martin). and very little of the Philadelphia debates
leaked. The records of the Federal Convention might also be relevant to help improve our comprehension
of how the ratifiers understood the Constitution. particularly to the extent that the Framers anticipated
objections that would be raised in the subsequent campaign. But this is a limited use that does not justify
the sort of detailed parsing of early drafts so common in scholarship about the Constitution. Knowing such
details undoubtedly affects one's choice among competing interpretations, which is precisely why we ought
to ignore them-they were unknown to those whose choices actually made the Constitution law. For a more
elaborate version of this argument, see Larry Kramer, Fidelity to Hisrory,-And Through It. 65 FoRDHA.t
L. REV. 1627, 1642-44 (1997). I have included discussion of the Convention debates on full faith and
credit both for general information and for those who find this son of thing more probative than I do.
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Full Faith and Credit Clause, introduced by the committee on postponed
matters, stated that full faith and credit "ought" to be given to public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of other states, and that Congress "shall"
prescribe how these are to be proven and also what effects judgments should
have.137 When the proposal was taken up for debate, Gouverneur Morris
proposed to extend the authority to prescribe effects to everything in the
clause, not just judgments. After this passed, Madison moved successfully to
substitute "shall" for "ought" in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and "may"
for "shall" in the Effects Clause.38 It thus appears that a deliberate decision
was made to make the basic requirement of full faith and credit mandatory and
to give Congress discretionary power to enforce it.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause received little scrutiny in the campaign
for ratification, presumably because it was largely identical to a provision
already found in the Articles of Confederation and thus not controversial.'39
The Effects Clause, however, was new-yet it too received virtually no
attention in the debates, which is surprising given the usual eagerness of Anti-
Federalists to find threats of despotism hiding in every new source of national
authority.14° The logical inference is that the power granted to Congress was
generally understood as authority to implement and facilitate the already
familiar requirement of full faith and credit.
This inference is consistent with Madison's elliptical discussion of the
power in The Federalist No. 42. Madison commends the Effects Clause as "an
evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the
articles of confederation," which, he says, is too "indeterminate" to serve any
useful purpose.14' "The power here established," Madison continues,
may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be
particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the
effects liable to justice, may be suddenly and secretly translated in
any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction. 42
The problem with the full faith and credit clause of the Articles of
Confederation, in other words, was that uncertainty about the nature of the
obligation it imposed left room for states to interpret it differently or narrowly
137. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 485 (Max Farrand cd., rev. ed.
1966) (James Madison, Sept. 1, 1787).
138. See id. at 488-89 (James Madison, Sept. 3, 1787).
139. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (Aug. 1776) ("Full faith and credit shall be given in
each of these states to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every
other State."). The extension of this obligation in the Constitution to include legislative as well as judicial
acts could have provoked a reaction but apparently did not do so.
140. None of the major Anti-Federalist essayists-Cato, Centinel, Federal Farmer, or Brutus-bothered
to discuss the Clause. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANT-FEDERALIST 101-452 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
141. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 287 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
142. Id.
2004 [Vol. 106: 1965
Same-Sex Marriage
(a problem most pronounced near the borders).,4 3 The power given to the
federal government, Madison explains, enables Congress to give the
requirement of full faith and credit a settled, uniform meaning, thus
diminishing potential abuses. There is nothing here about needing to relieve
states from an obligation that could become too onerous; Madison is describing
a power to clarify and enforce, not repeal or diminish.
Although this historical evidence is suggestive, I am reluctant to place
much weight on it. To be sure, nothing in the history affirmatively suggests
that Congress may relieve states of the obligation to recognize the laws and
judgments of sister states, but the evidence against allowing Congress to do so
is circumstantial and rests more on what was not said than on what was. Even
were the indications of original understanding clearer, moreover, the context
in which the problem arises has changed so much in the intervening two
centuries that it would be difficult to know just what to do with it. Our
conceptual framework has been radically altered since the eighteenth century.
Not only was the field of choice of law scarcely in its infancy in America in
1790, but we have substantially redefined such key concepts as legislative
jurisdiction, finality, res judicata, common law, territoriality, sovereignty, and
state interests. Further complicating matters, the respective roles of the state
and federal governments are vastly different today, as is the nature of interstate
relations. Who can say how the Founding generation would have viewed the
problem of congressional regulation of faith and credit in the modem context?
This is, of course, a pervasive problem in constitutional law, but most
questions have a history subsequent to the Founding that makes interpretation
plausible.' What makes the Effects Clause unusual, particularly when it
comes to regulating full faith and credit to laws, is that this power has
remained untested and practically unexercised for more than two centuries. We
do not know for sure what the Founding generation thought, but we also have
no intervening experience to help us understand what the Effects Clause has
become. The most one can say (and it is saying a lot) is this: Given that the
most natural reading of the text and legislative history would limit Congress's
power to facilitating and enforcing interstate recognition, Congress's failure
ever to exercise the power any other way counsels against its sudden expansion
now. The burden, if you will, is on those who urge us to let Congress do
something that seems contrary to the language of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, that is inconsistent with what we know of its history, and that
Congress has never done in its entire 208-year existence.
143. Although litigation involving questions of faith and credit was rare during the Confederation
period, state courts regularly found ways to avoid the obligation. See James D. Sumner. Jr.. The Full-Faith.
and-Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REV. 224. 230 (1955).
144. I have developed this argument more fully in Kramer, supra note 136. and Larry Kramer. Whatr
a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and 7theory Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal. 46 CASE W. REs.
L. REv. 885, 903-33 (1996).
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Against this background, the argument sketched above for allowing
Congress to relieve states of their full faith and credit obligations begins to
look rather less persuasive. Even apart from textual and historical difficulties,
the argument overstates the extent to which the Full Faith and Credit Clause
serves merely instrumental ends. We have grown accustomed (perhaps too
accustomed) to thinking about structural provisions of the Constitution in
strictly utilitarian terms, reserving for rights-bearing provisions the idea that the
Constitution also reflects a commitment to principles thought to be intrinsically
worthy. Yet the Full Faith and Credit Clause is more than a strategy to
minimize friction. It represents the very idea of what it means to be in a
Union. States are required to recognize and respect each other's laws because
that is what members of a federation do. It may sometimes produce tension,
but that inheres in the relationship, less a "cost" than an intrinsic characteristic.
This is a better way to understand and interpret the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Certainly the Founding generation thought of "Union" as more than a
handy tool to maximize the interests of member states, and the same ideal runs
throughout American history. One need not get dewy-eyed or make soppy
references to the Gettysburg Address to see that commitment to Union is itself
a fundamental constitutional value. As such, Congress should not be permitted
to redefine its terms at will or to legislate away the minimum requirements of
mutual respect and recognition it entails any more than Congress can suppress
speech or legislate inequality.
This interpretation of the Effects Clause is superior in functional terms as
well. For while Congress probably is, as a general matter, better situated than
any state to make dispassionate judgments about how best to minimize
interstate friction, federal legislators are still subject to plenty of short-term
pressures to act badly or for inappropriate reasons. 45 One way to guard
against this is to identify the fundamental elements of full faith and credit and
put these beyond the reach of ordinary politics.
Take, for example, one requirement of full faith and credit that everyone
accepts: No state may apply its law unless it has a legitimate interest in a
controversy. Now imagine that Congress enacted legislation overruling this
condition, permitting states with no material contact or connection to a case to
apply their laws anyway. Would this be permissible? Should it be? It is
theoretically possible, I suppose, that Congress could find some seemingly
rational explanation for enacting such legislation. But the likelihood that
145. The suggestion that Congress is better situated to make dispassionate judgments because it is
drawn from the whole nation is, of course, the central premise of Madison's famous argument in 7he
Federalist No. 10. When Madison first unveiled the argument in Philadelphia, however, Hamilton scribbled
in his notes what has always struck me as a devastating reply: "There is truth in [Madison's proposition],"
he wrote, but it does "not conclude so strongly as he supposes-The Assembly when chosen will meet in
one room if they are drawn from half the globe-& will be liable to all the passions of popular
assemblies." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton,
June 6, 1787).
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Congress would have been prompted to act by this hypothetical rationale,
rather than by an inappropriate consideration, seems remote. It makes more
sense simply to put the option beyond Congress's reach. The requirement that
no state apply its law without a legitimate interest is just too close to the core
of full faith and credit to risk congressional misadventure or misbehavior.
Can the same thing be said of the public policy exception? That is,
assuming I am right and that states cannot make this exception, should it also
be unconstitutional for Congress to do so? On the one hand, it is easier to
imagine plausible reasons for Congress to authorize a content-based exception
to ordinary choice-of-law rules. On the other hand, given the controversial
nature of the issues, the likelihood that Congress will act for improper reasons
is also much greater. To put the point bluntly, which of the following
explanations seems more plausible: that the members of Congress who
supported DOMA did so because they were concerned about interstate friction,
or that they did so because they shared the same distaste of same-sex marriage
as their state-level compatriots? In light of the tension between the public
policy exception and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this too should be
prohibited to Congress.
Such an interpretation still leaves a wide scope for Congress's power under
the Effects Clause. Congress may, for example, still enact a comprehensive
system of choice of law for the states if it so chooses. Or it can adopt rules to
govern a more limited set of issues. In enacting such legislation, however,
Congress must respect the same fundamental requirements of full faith and
credit as must states-including the requirement that dislike of a particular
policy not provide a basis for selective discrimination in deciding when one
state must recognize another state's law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The principal claim of this Article-that the public policy doctrine violates
the Full Faith and Credit Clause-may elicit patronizing chuckles from some
conflicts scholars. Most of them actually agree that the exception serves no
useful purpose, that it has mutated from a rule of jurisdiction reserved for
extreme cases into a freewheeling form of unarticulated interest balancing, and
that it is a bad idea. But the thought that a doctrine this old and this well-
established should suddenly turn out to be unconstitutional seems improbable
to many.
Apart from a reference to Holmes's famous quip about practices that have
been around since the time of Henry IV, '  together with a request to reread
146. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of rite Law, 10 HARV, L REV. 457. 469 (1897) (-It is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV")
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Erie147 and Shaffer v. Heitner148 (both cases abandoning very old, very
well-established rules), I can answer such critics only by reiterating that the
public policy exception is at odds with the whole idea of full faith and credit.
Faced with a practice that is inconsistent with the purpose underlying a
provision of the Constitution, inconsistent with what little precedent exists
interpreting that provision, and indefensible as a matter of policy, the mere fact
of age begins to look rather less impressive.
I am even more confident that if states cannot selectively discriminate
against each other's laws, Congress cannot authorize them to do so. Here we
enter completely uncharted territory, with little useful authority for guidance.
On balance, however, and much to my surprise because this was not what I
thought when I began to write, the better interpretation is that when Congress
legislates choice-of-law rules for the states, it must respect the same
fundamental limits. The idea of respect and equality implicit in the concept of
Union has an irreducible element that even Congress should not be permitted
to undo. In my view, this element includes a prohibition against distinctions
based on the relative "offensiveness" of a state's otherwise constitutional laws.
147. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
148. 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (overturning Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)).
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